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THROWING THE E-BOOK AT
PUBLISHERS: WHAT THE APPLE CASE
TELLS US ABOUT ANTITRUST LAW
Jared Killeen*
INTRODUCTION
On November 19, 2007, amid much buzz and speculation,
Amazon—the eminent online retailer—released its first Kindle ereader device.1 Less than eight inches in length, and weighing 10.3
ounces,2 the Kindle contained only a small screen and various
alphanumeric buttons.3 According to commentators, however,
Amazon’s little device “revolutionized” the publishing industry4
* J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School, 2014; M.A., Columbia University,
2008; B.A., Bard College, 2004. I wish to thank Rebecca Kaplan for her
perpetual support, and Raechel Killeen for her fastidious review of this Note’s
every line and footnote. I am also indebted to the members of the Journal of
Law and Policy, who have, by dint of some superhuman kindness, spent more
time working on this project than I have.
1
RICHARD L. BRANDT, ONE CLICK: JEFF BEZOS AND THE RISE OF
AMAZON.COM 139 ( 2011); see also Ryan Block, Live from the Amazon Kindle
Launch Event, ENGADGET (Nov. 19, 2007, 9:23 AM), http://www.engadget.com/
2007/11/19/live-from-the-amazon-kindle-launch-event/; Jack Schofield, Amazon
Will Launch Kindle e-Book Reader on Monday, GUARDIAN TECH. BLOG (Nov.
18, 2007, 3:33 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/blog/2007/nov/18/
amazonwilllaunchkindleeboo.
2
Amazon Kindle 1st-gen, ENGADGET, http://www.engadget.com/products/
amazon/kindle/1st-gen/specs/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2013).
3
The Kindle is an electronic reader (“e-reader”), a device on which
consumers may purchase and read electronic books (“e-books”). E-books are
like print books, but published in an electronic format. They are easily
downloaded through retailer Web sites or applications on mobile devices. See
Complaint at 2, United States v. Apple, Inc., 889 F. Supp. 2d 623 (S.D.N.Y.
2012) (No. 12 Civ. 2826), 2012 WL 1193205.
4
See, e.g., RYAN DEISS, KINDLE PUBLISHING REVOLUTION (2012),
available at http://www.amazon.com/Kindle-Publishing-Revolution-Amazon-
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and created a burgeoning e-book market.5 The success of the ebook revolution arose from the Kindle’s unique electronic-ink
display6 and wireless connectivity.7 Instead of purchasing a
physical book from a bookshop, or borrowing one from a library,
users could now connect directly to Amazon and, within seconds,
download an e-book from a vast selection of electronic files.8
Perhaps most appealing to consumers, however, was the “cut-rate”
price of Amazon e-books.9 Despite protests from book publishers,
Amazon sold new releases for only $9.99,10 well below production
ebook/dp/B008ZRGSY2; Matt Warman, Amazon’s New Kindle and
a Readers’ Revolution, TELEGRAPH (Oct. 15, 2011, 7:00 AM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/amazon/8827796/Amazons-new-Kindleand-a-readers-revolution.html; Steve Windwalker, Just How Big Is
the Kindle Revolution?, SEEKING ALPHA (Jan. 14, 2011, 7:45 PM),
http://seekingalpha.com/article/246700-just-how-big-is-the-kindle-revolution.
5
Within six months of launching the Kindle, Amazon had sold one
hundred thousand units. By 2011, the company had sold well over twenty
million units. See Windwalker, supra note 4. More astoundingly, by 2010,
Amazon e-books comprised up to twenty percent of sales for major book
publishers. BRANDT, supra note 1, at 142.
6
See BRANDT, supra note 1, at 140. The Kindle display, unlike computer
screens and earlier e-reader devices, used electronic ink (“e-ink”). The e-ink
display contained millions of “microcapsules” that formed a pleasant white
background over which darker text appeared. Id. at 140–41. Consumers found eink easier to read for long periods of time than the text on standard computer
screens. Id.
7
The Kindle connected to the Internet via a system called Whispernet.
Schofield, supra note 1. Connectivity allowed users not only to download ebooks in a matter of seconds, but also to subscribe to newspapers and
magazines. Id. As a result, Amazon Chief Executive Officer Jeff Bezos has
stated that the Kindle isn’t merely “a device, it’s a service.” Id.
8
BRANDT, supra note 1, at 140. Before Amazon released the Kindle, most
e-readers were clunky and expensive, offering only a small selection of
downloadable titles. Id. at 137–41. Because Amazon began as an online
“bookstore,” however, the company had existing contracts with large book
publishers and was able to offer ninety thousand titles upon the Kindle’s release
in 2007. Id. at 141.
9
Id. at 142.
10
Id. See also Competitive Impact Statement at 3, United States v. Apple,
Inc., 889 F. Supp. 2d 623 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 12 Civ. 2826), 2012 WL
1193207; Sarah Lacy, Confessions of a Publisher: “We’re in Amazon’s Sights
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cost.11
Amazon quickly turned the e-book revolution into a coup. The
company’s willingness to lose money on e-book sales12 rendered
the market unattractive to competitors, which uniformly declined
to participate in a costly price war.13 Thus, by 2012, with a ninetypercent share of the e-book market,14 Amazon had established an
effective monopoly.15 Amazon used its new-found dominance to
force the “Big Six” New York book publishers (“publishers”)16
and They’re Going to Kill Us,” PANDODAILY (Jan. 17, 2012),
http://pandodaily.com/2012/01/17/confessions-of-a-publisher-were-in-amazonssights-and-theyre-going-to-kill-us/.
11
Brief of Bob Kohn as Amicus Curiae at 22, United States v. Apple, Inc.,
889 F. Supp. 2d 623 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 12 Civ. 2826).
12
See Rory Maher, Here’s Why Amazon Will Win The e-Book War: Kindle
Already Has 90% e-Book Share, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 13, 2010, 12:38 PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/amazon-selling-90-of-all-e-books-2010-1
(estimating from American Association of Book Publishers’ data that Amazon
lost $35 million on e-book sales through October 2009); see also Brief of Bob
Kohn, supra note 11, at 20–21; BRANDT, supra note 1, at 142.
13
By selling e-books at a loss, Amazon wished to keep competitors “from
getting a foothold on the virtual bookshelf.” BRANDT, supra note 1, at 142–43.
The strategy clearly worked. For years, Amazon’s predatory pricing deterred
competitors like Apple, Google, Barnes & Noble, and Zola Books from entering
the e-book market. See United States v. Apple, Inc., 889 F. Supp. 2d 623, 640
(S.D.N.Y. 2012).
14
See, e.g., Comments of Barnes & Noble, Inc. on the Proposed Final
Judgment at 9, United States v. Apple, Inc., 889 F. Supp. 2d 623 (S.D.N.Y.
2012) (No. 12 Civ. 2826); Michael Hiltzick, Government’s e-Book Case Helps
Amazon Build Toward a Monopoly, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2012),
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/sep/12/business/la-fi-hiltzik-20120912; Maher,
supra note 12; Matt Phillips, Amazon e-Book Share to Fall from 90% to 35%,
Analysts Say, WSJ MARKETBEAT (Feb. 16, 2010, 10:59 AM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/marketbeat/2010/02/16/analyst-amazon-e-book-share-tofall-from-90-to-35/.
15
See, e.g., Stacy Mitchell, Justice Department Abets Amazon’s
e-Book Monopoly, INST. LOCAL SELF-RELIANCE (June 20, 2012),
http://www.ilsr.org/dojs-lawsuit/.
16
The so-called “Big Six” include Hachette, Harper Collins, Macmillan,
Penguin, Random House, and Simon & Schuster. Get Published!: Who Are the
Big Six Publishers?, PRITCHETT, FARLOW, & SMITH PUBLISHERS (Mar. 1, 2011,
1:39 PM), http://www.pfspublishing.com/workshop/2011/03/get-publishedwho-are-the-big-six.html. However, the publishers do not appear all that “big”
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into continuing to sell e-books cheaply, inspiring concern that
consumers would become accustomed to untenably low prices.17
Moreover, Amazon’s predatory tactics created inefficiency in the
e-book market by spurring overconsumption of e-books at
artificially low prices. These tactics skewed the e-book demand
curve18 and threatened the welfare of consumers who, under
Amazon’s monopoly, would not enjoy the benefits of healthy price
and product competition in the e-book market.19 Government
regulators, however, did nothing.20
In 2009, book publishers took action to curb Amazon’s
alongside retail behemoth Amazon, whose 2011 sales topped $48.08 billion. See
Donald Melanson, Amazon Announces 2011 Q4 Results: Sales Jump to $17.43
billion, but Profits Drop 58 percent, ENGADGET (Jan. 31, 2012, 4:26 PM),
http://www.engadget.com/2012/01/31/amazon-announces-q4-2011-results-salesjump-to-17-43-billion/. In comparison, the combined revenue of all six book
publishers barely topped $10 billion in 2011. Penguin sales totaled $1.71 billion.
See Penguin Sales Rise 26% on 6% Sales Gains, PUBLISHERS WEEKLY (Feb. 28,
2011), http://www.publishersweekly.com/pw/by-topic/industry-news/financialreporting/article/46323-penguin-has-record-2010.html. Hachette sales totaled
$2.64 billion; Random House sales totaled $2.57 billion; Macmillan sales totaled
$1.9 billion; Harper Collins sales totaled $1.1 billion; and Simon & Schuster
sales totaled $787 million. See The Global 50: The World’s
Largest Book Publishers, 2012, PUBLISHERS WEEKLY (June 25, 2012),
http://www.publishersweekly.com/pw/by-topic/industry-news/financialreporting/article/52677-the-world-s-54-largest-book-publishers-2012.html.
17
For instance, when Macmillan refused to abide by Amazon’s pricing
model, the latter removed MacMillan’s books from its Web site. See BRANDT,
supra note 1, at 143. See also Christopher Matthews, Should Justice Drop the
Apple Ebook Lawsuit?, TIME (July 23, 2012), http://business.time.com/2012/07/
23/should-justice-drop-the-apple-ebook-lawsuit/ (observing that the shift to an
agency model was an effort by publishers to prevent Amazon from setting its
prices too low); Competitive Impact Statement, supra note 10, at 4; Complaint,
supra note 3, at 2.
18
See Christopher R. Leslie, Comment, Achieving Efficiency Through
Collusion: A Market Failure Defense to Horizontal Price-Fixing, 81 CALIF. L.
REV. 243 (1993) (arguing that horizontal price-fixing can help markets function
more efficiently by ensuring that supply does not grossly exceed demand).
19
See Comments of Barnes & Noble, Inc. on the Proposed Final Judgment
at 10, United States v. Apple, Inc., 889 F. Supp. 2d 623 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 12
Civ. 2826).
20
See Mitchell, supra note 15.
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stranglehold on the e-book market. They devised a plan with
technology company Apple to stop Amazon’s predatory pricing.21
At the same time Amazon enjoyed an e-book monopoly, Apple
was preparing to release its iPad tablet, which functioned as an ereader. But Apple, like other retailers, was reluctant to enter the
Amazon-dominated e-book market.22 Publishers recognized
Apple’s dilemma as an opportunity both to increase competition
by helping Apple penetrate the market and to restore economic
efficiency by ensuring that e-books were no longer sold below
production cost. In order to effectuate this change, publishers and
Apple “jointly agreed to alter the business model governing the
relationship between publishers and retailers.”23
Until then, retailers had sold print and e-books according to the
“wholesale” model. Under this model, publishers sold e-book titles
to wholesale retailers at a fixed price,24 and retailers resold the
titles to consumers at whatever price they wished.25 In place of the
wholesale model, Apple and the publishers agreed to institute the
“agency model.”26 Under the agency model, “publishers would
take control of retail pricing by appointing retailers as ‘agents.’”27
Thus, instead of reselling e-books to consumers at any price they
liked—as Amazon had been doing for years—agent retailers like
Apple would sell e-book titles at publisher-determined prices.
These retailers would receive a thirty-percent commission on each
sale, guaranteeing them a profit28 and precluding losses associated
with below-cost e-book prices. With Apple entering the market and
21

Complaint, supra note 3, at 3.
Id.
23
Id.
24
Under the wholesale model, publishers usually sold books to retailers at
fifty percent of the print book’s “list price.” See Competitive Impact Statement,
supra note 10, at 3.
25
Id. Under this system, an e-book with a list price of $26.00 would be sold
to Amazon for $13.00. Amazon could in turn sell the title to consumers for
$9.99—a marginal loss of $3.00. See Brief of Bob Kohn, supra note 11, at 20–
21.
26
Complaint, supra note 3, at 4.
27
Id.
28
Id.
22
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publishers unanimously resolved to improve pricing, Amazon was
forced to capitulate to the agency model.29 This shift in model
addressed the so-called “$9.99 problem”30 and permitted the
reestablishment of tenable e-book prices—generally between
$12.99 and $14.99.31
At last, on April 11, 2012, several years after the establishment
of Amazon’s pernicious monopoly, the U.S. Department of Justice
(“the DOJ” or “the government”) finally took action.32
Unfortunately, however, the government’s intervention defied both
common logic and popular expectations.33 In a shocking turn, the
DOJ did not file an antitrust suit against Amazon, as many had
expected it would.34 Rather, to the utter dismay of the publishing
industry,35 the government brought charges against five of the Big
Six book publishers.36 In a complaint filed with the U.S. District
29

Id. at 16, 25–28.
Id. at 9–11.
31
Id. at 5.
32
See Complaint, supra note 3.
33
See, e.g., Thomas Catan et al., U.S. Alleges e-Book
Scheme, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 11, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052702304444604577337573054615152.html; Ylan Q. Mui &
Hayley Tsukayama, Justice Department Sues Apple, Publishers Over e-Book
Prices, WASH. POST (Apr. 11, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/
economy/justice-department-files-suit-against-apple-publishers-reportsays/2012/04/11/gIQAzyXSAT_story.html; Elizabeth Wasserman, DOJ Sues
Apple, Publishers On e-Book Prices, POLITICO (Apr. 11, 2012),
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0412/75028.html.
34
Many critics believe that the DOJ filed suit against the wrong party. For
example, publishing industry analyst Mike Shatzkin noted, “It is an incredible
irony that antitrust law is being used to protect the biggest monopolist.” John
Gapper, Don’t Make Amazon a Monopoly, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2011),
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ed2a1b20-2644-11e1-9ed3-00144feabdc0.html. In an
amicus brief to the district court, attorney Bob Kohn requested that the DOJ
release its report on Amazon’s predatory pricing tactics. See Laura Hazard
Owen, Attorney Asks DOJ to Release Findings on Amazon’s
“Predatory” Ebook Pricing, PAIDCONTENT (Aug. 13, 2012, 1:06 PM),
http://paidcontent.org/2012/08/13/attorney-asks-doj-to-release-its-findings-onamazons-predatory-pricing-of-ebooks/.
35
See Gapper, supra note 34; Owen, supra note 34.
36
See Complaint, supra note 3. Of the “Big Six” publishers, only Random
30
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Court for the Southern District of New York, the DOJ claimed that
publishers illegally conspired with e-book retailer Apple to “limit
competition in the sale of e-books.”37 This, however, was a gross
mischaracterization of both the motive and the effect of the
publishers’ conduct. In its misapplication of antitrust law, the DOJ
demonstrated not only a lack of understanding of the emerging ebook market, but also an appalling unfamiliarity with modern
economic theory.
Still more shocking was the warm reception afforded by the
United States District Court to the DOJ’s flawed antitrust
argument. Even before United States v. Apple, Inc.38 went to trial,
Judge Denise Cote announced in a preliminary hearing that she
believed the DOJ would prevail.39 The court’s pointed
prognostication augured poorly for the book publishers. Faced with
the prospect of hopeless litigation and a predetermined outcome,
each publisher eventually settled out of court—leaving only Apple
to defend itself.40 On July 10, 2013, following several weeks of a
House escaped suit. See id.
37
Id. at 2.
38
United States v. Apple, Inc., 889 F. Supp. 2d 623, 626 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
39
See Phillip Elmer-DeWitt, U.S. Judge in E-Book Antitrust Trial Says
Apple is Likely to Lose, CNN (May 24, 2013, 8:05 AM),
http://tech.fortune.cnn.com/2013/05/24/apple-ebooks-antitrust-judge/.
Judge
Cote, hardly encouraging publishers to seek their day in court, stated: “I believe
that the government will be able to show at trial direct evidence that Apple
knowingly participated in and facilitated a conspiracy to raise prices of e-books,
and that the circumstantial evidence in this case, including the terms of the
agreements, will confirm that.” Id.
40
Of the five publisher defendants charged in the DOJ complaint, Hachette,
HarperCollins, and Simon & Schuster settled almost immediately. See Apple,
Inc., 889 F. Supp. 2d at 626. The remaining publishers—Penguin and
Macmillan—eventually conceded to crushing settlement agreements. See
Andrew Albanese, Macmillan E-Book Settlement, Will Pay $26 Million,
PUBLISHERS WEEKLY (Apr. 29, 2013), http://www.publishersweekly.com/
pw/by-topic/digital/content-and-e-books/article/57013-macmillan-finalizes-ebook-settlement-will-pay-26-million.html; Julie Bosman, Penguin to Pay $75
Million in E-Book Settlement with States, N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/23/business/media/penguin-to-pay-75million-in-e-book-settlement-with-states.html [hereinafter Bosman, Penguin to
Pay].
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contentious trial, Judge Cote issued her decision.41 The District
Court held that “Apple had illegally conspired with five of the six
biggest publishers to try to raise prices in the budding e-books
market.”42 Before the case went to trial, such a notion—that
publishers broke the law by correcting the artificial decline of ebook prices—might have been unthinkable. But what many
commentators found a shocking judicial determination in light of
Amazon’s e-book monopoly had, by the end of the Apple trial,
come to be seen as a foregone conclusion.
The District Court’s conclusion in United States v. Apple, Inc.
is misguided. When properly analyzed, nothing in the factual
history of the case suggested that Apple or the book publishers
acted improperly. Moreover, the DOJ’s suit against the defendants
was based on faulty grounds. The DOJ argued that publishers
harmed consumers by increasing the prices of e-books above the
artificially low point created by Amazon.43 In order to “effectuate
their conspiracy,”44 the DOJ contended, publishers entered into
two types of business arrangements that are often the subject of
antitrust law. First, in establishing the agency model, publishers
effectuated a “vertical arrangement” with Apple.45 An arrangement
is vertical “when it links two markets in the same chain of
manufacture and distribution, usually through the linkage of two
firms that either do or could stand in the relationship of supplier
and customer.”46 In this case, the agency model created a vertical
41

United States v. Apple, Inc., No. 12 Civ. 2826, 2013 WL 3454986
(S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2013).
42
David Streitfeld, E-Book Ruling Gives Amazon an Advantage, N.Y.
TIMES (July 10, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/11/business/e-bookruling-gives-amazon-an-advantage.html [hereinafter Streitfeld, E-Book Ruling].
43
The government contends that “the goal of antitrust law . . . is to keep
prices low for consumers’ benefit.” Response of Plaintiff United States to Public
Comments on the Proposed Final Judgment at 21, United States v. Apple, Inc.,
889 F. Supp. 2d 623 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 12 Civ. 2826) (citation omitted). The
“low price” principle, however, is completely unfounded in antitrust
jurisprudence.
44
Complaint, supra note 3 at 2.
45
See id. at 2, 6–7, 16–30.
46
ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 18 (The Free Press 1993)
(1978).
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arrangement between the publishers (suppliers) and Apple
(customer). The fact that book publishers and Apple agreed to sell
e-books at certain predetermined prices constituted a “retail-price
restraint,”47 conduct that is widely presumed to be legal.48 Such
restraints are typically reviewed under “the rule of reason”
standard, whereby courts consider not only the restraint itself, but
its context, purpose and effect.49
Second, according to the DOJ, publishers entered into a
“horizontal arrangement” with one another when they
communicated about setting new above-cost e-book prices.50 A
horizontal arrangement describes conduct by rivals in a single
market—in this case, the five publishers in the e-book market—
and often concerns price-setting.51 According to the DOJ, under
current antitrust doctrine, horizontal price-setting of any kind is
presumed to violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act,52 the
quintessential antitrust statute. This means that, unlike the vertical
retail-price restraint on e-books established between publishers and
Apple, the horizontal price agreement among publishers would be
evaluated under the per se illegal (the “per se”) standard.53
The horizontal arrangement among publishers, therefore, was
the central issue in United States v. Apple, Inc. Pursuant to the per
se standard, defendants were not permitted to expound upon the
nature of their industry or their reasons for entering a horizontal
47

Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 878
(2007) (“The justifications for vertical price restraints are similar to those for
other vertical restraints. Minimum resale price maintenance can stimulate
interbrand competition among manufacturers selling different brands of the
same type of product by reducing intrabrand competition among retailers selling
the same brand.”).
48
See JEFFREY L. KESSLER & SPENCER WEBER WALLER, INTERNATIONAL
TRADE AND U.S. ANTITRUST LAW § 1:10 (2d ed.). See also Leegin, 551 U.S. at
877 (finding a vertical retail price restraint to be legal).
49
Leslie, supra note 18, at 247.
50
See Complaint, supra note 3, at 18–26. The DOJ alleged that publishing
executives engaged in numerous phone conversations and meetings in order to
establish the agency model and combat Amazon’s predatory pricing. Id. at 12.
51
BORK, supra note 46, at 17–18.
52
Complaint, supra note 3, at 32.
53
Id.
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arrangement.54 Therefore, although the Apple case presented
complicated facts concerning a unique and changing industry, not
to mention the circumstances of Amazon’s monopoly, the court
gave publishers and Apple little opportunity to explain their
conduct. Because the publishers, like Apple, would have been
summarily found guilty of price fixing, it is no surprise that they
resigned themselves to unfavorable settlement agreements. Not
only have they agreed to abandon the robust agency model, but
publishers must pay enormous fines. Penguin Group, for instance,
resolved to pay $75 million in “consumer damages” rather than go
before a federal judge who had already determined its fate.55
This Note contends that contemporary antitrust policy is built
upon shaky doctrinal ground and must be reevaluated. The fact that
it is per se illegal, under current law, for book publishers to attempt
to stop Amazon’s predatory tactics demonstrates that U.S. antitrust
policy is in a sad state of disrepair.56 Still more upsetting is the fact
that, under the per se standard, publishers have been dissuaded
from telling their story to the court. Accordingly, the United States
v. Apple, Inc. decision presents a vital opportunity to reexamine
our antitrust law. In short, the type of horizontal arrangements at
the center of United States v. Apple, Inc. ought to be evaluated not
only under the rule of reason, but under a new, updated threeprong rule of reason test that incorporates modern economic
theory.57
54

Id.
Bosman, Penguin to Pay, supra note 40.
56
One need only read the 800 public comments written in opposition to this
case to understand the outrage and confusion the DOJ’s lawsuit has caused
among authors, independent publishers, and booksellers. See Antitrust
Division: United States v. Apple, Inc., et al., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/apple/index.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2013).
57
This theory will draw from two primary sources. First is the basic tenets
of the Chicago School of Economics, as espoused by Bork in his seminal book
on antitrust law, which value economic efficiency in a market above all else. See
generally BORK, supra note 46. The second source is the so-called “theory of the
second best,” which suggests that one failure in a particular market may be
corrected by a second failure. R.G. Lipsey & Kevin Lancaster, The General
Theory of Second Best, in READINGS IN SOCIAL WELFARE: THEORY AND POLICY
47, 48 (Robert Kuenne ed., 2000).
55
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As background, Part I provides a brief history of antitrust law.
Part I.A recounts the emergence of the law’s governing
standards—the traditional per se and the rule-of-reason
standards—while Part I.B identifies some of the fallacious ideas
that continue to plague antitrust law. Part II describes two positive
trends in antitrust law arising from modern economic theory that
support the adoption of a new, updated three-prong rule of reason.
The first is a move away from per se analysis; the second is a
growing realization that economic efficiency is the best measure of
antitrust policy and the most effective way to promote consumer
welfare. Part III reviews Supreme Court precedent supporting the
argument that, in United States v. Apple, Inc., publishers’
horizontal arrangement should have been analyzed under a general
test pursuant to the rule of reason standard. Part IV sets forth a new
specific three-part economic-effects test for horizontal
arrangements, whereby an arrangement may be found legal when
(1) the relevant economic market is unfamiliar or unique, (2) the
horizontal arrangement is ancillary to a proper aim, and (3) the
arrangement improves economic efficiency. The Note concludes
that under this new standard the publishers’ horizontal arrangement
in United States v. Apple, Inc. should be found legal upon appeal.
In United States v. Apple, Inc., the DOJ and the District Court
harmed both the publishing industry and modern antitrust-law
policy. “The Department of Justice has unwittingly caused further
consolidation in the industry at a time when consolidation is not
necessarily a good thing,” said Mark Coker, the chief executive of
an e-book distributor. “If you want a vibrant ecosystem of multiple
publishers, multiple publishing methods and multiple successful
retailers in 5, 20 or 50 years, we took a step backwards [with the
District Court’s decision].”58 While both Apple and the publishers
were punished by the court, Amazon has been left to reestablish its
monopoly over the e-book market through predatory pricing.59 But
there is still hope. Recent reports suggest that Apple plans to
appeal the District Court’s decision.60 Thus, the U.S. Court of
58

Streitfeld, E-Book Ruling, supra note 42.
Id.
60
Blair Hanley Frank, Apple Loses E-books Antitrust Case, but Vows to
Appeal, GEEKWIRE (July 10, 2013, 8:52 AM), http://www.geekwire.com/2013/
59
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Appeals for the Second Circuit—and perhaps even the U.S.
Supreme Court—will be given an opportunity to address the dire
state of contemporary antitrust law. Should the higher courts
reconsider their policy in light of modern economic theory, it is
possible that the next decision in United States v. Apple, Inc. will
be the right one.
I. THE CHECKERED HISTORY OF ANTITRUST LAW
On July 2, 1890, President Benjamin Harrison signed into law
Bill S. I, later called the Sherman Act.61 The “oldest and most basic
of the antitrust statutes,”62 the Act originally comprised only two
terse sections. Its plain language, however, was expansive in
scope:
Section 1: Every contract, combination in the form
of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations, is hereby declared illegal.63
Section 2: Every person who shall monopolize, or
attempt to monopolize, or combine and conspire
with any other person, to monopolize any part of the
trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a
misdemeanor. . . .64
The breadth of the text gave earlier federal courts considerable
discretion in determining subsidiary antitrust laws.65 This could
apple-loses-ebook-antitrust-case/.
61
BORK, supra note 46, at 19.
62
Id. at 61.
63
Id. at 19 (alteration in original) (quoting 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (1890)).
64
Id. at 20 (quoting 15 U.S.C.A. § 2). In subsequent versions of Section 2,
“misdemeanor” was replaced with “felony.” See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
65
BORK, supra note 46, at 20. See also WILLIAM HOLMES & MELISSA
MANGIARACINA, ANTITRUST LAW HANDBOOK § 2:9 (2012) (“Taken literally,
[the] extremely broad language [of Section 1] would prohibit virtually any
business combination or agreement, including competitively desirable as well as
undesirable arrangements. Not surprisingly, the courts have interpreted the
statute far more narrowly . . . .”).
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hardly have been considered problematic, as the goal of the
Sherman Act might have appeared clear enough.66 The statute
would promote consumer welfare by preventing the formation of
harmful business arrangements and ensuring healthy market
competition.67 Specifically, Section 1 precluded horizontal
arrangements, like cartels and mergers,68 while Section 2
prohibited the formation of monopolies through predatory tactics.69
The Sherman Act thus had a simple purpose with a clear
application.
One hundred and twenty-two years later, this has proven not to
be the case. Today’s antitrust policy is muddled at best. The
purpose of the Sherman Act is frequently misplaced;70 indeed, one
need look no further than the DOJ’s incorrect claim, in United
States v. Apple, Inc., that the goal of antitrust law is to ensure the
lowest price of goods.71 Despite its terseness, the “singularly
66

Even so, Judge Richard Posner suggests that the framers approached the
law with contradictory aims. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 34 (2d
ed. 2001). On the one hand, they were concerned with trusts and monopolies
harming smaller businesses with predatory pricing; on the other hand, they
wished to prevent powerful businesses from harming customers with high
prices. Id. In the end, “[p]rotecting competitors from low prices and consumers
from high prices are incompatible objectives . . . .” Id.
67
See BORK, supra note 46, at 17; see also United States v. Addyston Pipe
& Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 281 (6th Cir. 1898) (finding that contracts legal pursuant
to the Sherman Act are upheld “because it is for the benefit of the public at large
that they should be enforced”), aff’d as modified, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). The
Supreme Court later determined “that that the Sherman Act only invalidated
those agreements which ‘unreasonably’ restrain trade. The Court defined the
term ‘unreasonable’ by equating it with ‘anticompetitive.’ Consequently, the
effect on competition soon became the primary, if not sole, focus determining
the reasonableness of a challenged trade restraint.” Leslie, supra note 18, at 245
(citing Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911)).
68
BORK, supra note 46, at 19–20.
69
Id. at 20.
70
See, e.g., id. at 16–49 (describing, inter alia, the missteps of Justice
Hughes).
71
See Response of Plaintiff United States to Public Comments, supra note
43, at 21. As we will see, the true goal of antitrust policy is the promotion of
consumer welfare through increased economic efficiency (and not, as the
government claimed in the Apple case, the lowest price of goods).
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opaque”72 language of the Sherman Act has given rise to
inconsistent precedent.73 This is due, in large part, to the courts’
failure to apply reliable and consistent doctrines to the statute’s
bare language. As Professor Andrew Gavill has quipped, “After
one hundred years one might expect a rule of law to be settled.”74
But apparently this is expecting too much. The courts have
muddied the waters of antitrust jurisprudence, and, before we
attempt to clear things up, the turgidity is worth examining.
A. Early Antitrust Law: Per Se Illegality and the Rule of
Reason
As Judge Posner laments, antitrust law has always suffered
from a rather “confusing history.”75 Its progress, however, is
marked by at least one persistent theme: the ongoing tension
between the rule of per se illegality and the rule of reason. 76 Both
are standards by which the courts evaluate alleged Sherman Act
violations. The per se rule is a black-letter prohibition on specific
types of business arrangements.77 These business arrangements
traditionally govern restraints that are purely anticompetitive; thus,
72

BORK, supra note 46, at 20.
Id. at 17.
74
Andrew I. Gavil, Moving Beyond Caricature and Characterization: The
Modern Rule of Reason in Practice, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 733, 733 (2012).
75
POSNER, supra note 66, at 34 n.5.
76
The Supreme Court has since noted that the per se rule and the rule of
reason in fact occupy two ends of the same spectrum. See Nat’l Collegiate
Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 104 n.26 (1984)
(“[N]o bright line separat[es] per se from Rule of Reason analysis.”); see also
HOLMES & MANGIARACINA, supra note 65, § 2:9 (“The distinction between
practices deemed per se illegal, and those that are instead to be judged by the
rule of reason or by some intermediate standard, is anything but immutable. . . .
[P]ractices that have at one time been analyzed under one test have later been
brought under an altogether different standard.”); Thomas A. Piraino, Jr.,
Making Sense of the Rule of Reason: A New Standard for Section 1 of the
Sherman Act, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1753, 1769 (1994) [hereinafter Piraino, Making
Sense of the Rule of Reason] (“The courts can clarify Section 1 analysis by
recognizing that the rule of reason and per se rules are not opposite theoretical
approaches but simply different evidentiary standards.”).
77
Leslie, supra note 18, at 245.
73
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in order for the government to justify a per se prohibition, such a
restraint must “lack any redeeming virtue.”78 When a particular
restraint falls within the per se category, it is deemed unreasonable
as a matter of law;79 thus, courts do not consider its context,
purpose, or effect on the economic market. A number of
restraints—including group boycotts, tying arrangements, and the
division of markets—have been deemed per se illegal by the U.S.
Supreme Court.80 It is the type of horizontal price-fixing at the
center of United States v. Apple, Inc., however, that is considered
the “epitome of a per se violation.”81
The traditional rule of reason, on the other hand, constitutes a
more nuanced analysis of business conduct. It requires that courts
consider not only the trade restraint itself, but its context, purpose,
and effect.82 This means evaluating the nature of the industry, the
reasons that the restraint was imposed, and whether or not it has
had the desired consequence.83 Through an economic effects test, a
“court may determine that the procompetitive benefits of a specific
restraint outweigh its anticompetitive effects and, accordingly,
allow it to survive the rule of reason.”84
Both standards first surfaced in United States v. TransMissouri Freight Ass’n,85 an early antitrust case concerning a
conspiracy among railroad operators to establish fixed rates.86
78

Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886
(2007) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
79
See Leslie, supra note 18, at 245.
80
Id. at 246.
81
Id.; see also United States v. Sacony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223
(1940) (finding per se illegal any “combination formed for the purpose and with
the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a
commodity in interstate or foreign commerce”).
82
See Leslie, supra note 18, at 247.
83
See Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
84
Leslie, supra note 18, at 247.
85
United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
86
Id. at 299. Led by Justice Peckham, the Supreme Court struck down the
arrangement and “framed a rule of per se illegality for cartel price fixing.”
BORK, supra note 46, at 23. One may argue that the per se rule arose from a
broad reading of Section 1 of the Sherman Act: if an arrangement is
overwhelmingly likely to restrict trade, then all similar arrangements are
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Employing the per se rule, the majority proposed a predictable way
to appraise horizontal arrangements that obviated the need for
intricate economic analysis.87 Thus, the majority in Trans-Missouri
implicitly rejected a rule of reason standard,88 though Justice White
proposed precisely that standard in his dissent.89 In a narrower
reading of the Sherman Act, White argued that “only such
contracts as unreasonably restrain trade are violative of the general
law . . . .” 90 Thus, by butting heads with the majority, White set in
motion the defining debate of antitrust law.
This debate amplified in 1898, when Judge Taft, in United
States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel, Co., dialed back the expansive per
se rule. He did so with a seemingly counterintuitive proclamation:
“[I]t is in the interest of trade that certain covenants in restraint of
trade should be enforced.”91 The Addyston case, like Transassumed to be illegal.
87
In carving out a category of illegal conduct, the Court preferred a hatchet
to a scalpel. See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (“[T]here
are certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on
competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be
unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise
harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use. This principle of per
se unreasonableness . . . avoids the necessity for an incredibly complicated and
prolonged economic investigation into the entire history of the industry involved
. . . .”). See also BORK, supra note 46, at 26 (“[Peckham’s] rejection of a
reasonable-price standard of legality may have saved the [Sherman Act] from
becoming a judicially administered version of the National Recovery
Administration, allowing cartels but policing their prices and behavior.”).
88
Justice Peckham, like Chief Justice Taft after him, cautioned that “[i]f
only that kind of contract which is in unreasonable restraint of trade be within
the meaning of the statute, and declared therein to be illegal, it is at once
apparent that the subject of what is a reasonable rate is attended with great
uncertainty.” Trans-Missouri, 166 U.S. at 331. See also Standard Oil Co. of N.J.
v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 65 (1911) (As per se illegal arrangements “were
clearly restraints of trade within the purview of the statute, they could not be
taken out of that category by indulging in general reasoning as to the expediency
or nonexpediency of having made the contracts, or the wisdom or want of
wisdom of the statute which prohibited their being made.”).
89
Trans-Missouri, 166 U.S. at 343–74 (White, J., dissenting).
90
Id. at 344.
91
United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 280 (6th Cir.
1898).
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Missouri Freight, concerned horizontal price restrictions—this
time established by six manufacturers of cast iron pipe.92 Taft
recognized that seemingly anticompetitive arrangements, which
would typically fall into the per se illegal category, were
sometimes beneficial. He reasoned, for instance, that a restraint is
permissible if it is ancillary to a lawful contract.93 To qualify as
“ancillary,” a restraint “eliminating competition must be
subordinate and collateral to a separate, legitimate transaction.”94
For instance, Taft reasoned, a restraint is ancillary—and therefore
lawful—when it acts only to protect one party from the unchecked
competition of a competitor.95 By introducing the doctrine of
ancillary restraints, “Taft recognized that some restrictions upon
rivalry are socially valuable”96 and thus limited the number of
business arrangements that fell under per se restrictions.97 This
loosening of the per se rule had the effect of encouraging
beneficial agreements and promoting the original goal of antitrust
policy: consumer welfare.98
Justice White articulated a revised rule of reason in two
companion opinions written in 1911—this time writing for the

92

Id. at 272–74.
Id. at 282. Chief Justice Taft states that “no conventional restraint of
trade can be enforced unless the covenant embodying it is merely ancillary to
the main purpose of a lawful contract . . . .” Id. Taft thus demonstrated that the
per se rule and the rule of reason might peaceably coexist, proposing “a rule of
per se illegality for what have been called ‘naked restraints,’ agreements in
which the parties engage in no significant dealings other than the elimination of
competition,” and a rule of reason when ancillary restraints eliminate
competition as a means of creating efficiency. BORK, supra note 46, at 27.
94
BORK, supra note 46, at 27.
95
Addyston Pipe, 85 F. at 282.
96
BORK, supra note 46, at 27.
97
Chief Justice Taft’s ancillary-restraints doctrine “would validate all
vertical arrangements.” Id. at 29.
98
Addyston Pipe, 85 F. at 281 (“Contracts for the partial restraint of trade
are upheld, not because they are advantageous to the individual with whom the
contract is made, and a sacrifice pro tanto of the rights of the community, but
because it is for the benefit of the public at large that they should be enforced.”)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
93
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Court’s majority.99 Both Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United
States and United States v. American Tobacco Co. reconfirmed
that the Sherman Act’s goal is the “maximization of consumer
welfare.”100 Under White’s revised rule of reason, the Court had to
weigh certain factors before determining whether a restraint of
trade was per se illegal or whether it merited closer analysis.101
Toward this end, White proposed what would become the standard
three-prong economic-effects test.102 First, under the “inherent
nature” prong, which incorporates the per se standard, the court
determines whether an activity is presumed illegal.103 Second, if
the activity falls outside of the per se illegal category, the Court
inquires as to its “inherent effect.”104 Finally, the court considers
the “evident purpose” of the activity.105 This three-prong
economic-effects test would come to dominate Supreme Court
99

See Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60–62 (1911);
United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 179–80 (1911).
100
BORK, supra note 46, at 34.
101
Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 63. By emphasizing the importance of reason,
Justice White found that “judgment must in every case be called into play in
order to determine whether a particular act is embraced within the statutory
classes, and whether, if the act is within such classes, its nature or effect causes
it to be a restraint of trade within the intendment of the act.” Id.
102
American Tobacco, 221 U.S. at 179 (“Applying the rule of reason to the
construction of the statute, it was held in the Standard Oil Case that, as the
words ‘restraint of trade’ at common law and in the law of this country at the
time of the adoption of the anti-trust act only embraced acts or contracts or
agreements or combinations which operated to the prejudice of the public
interests by unduly restricting competition, or unduly obstructing the due course
of trade, or which, either because of their inherent nature or effect, or because of
the evident purpose of the acts, etc., injuriously restrained trade, that the words
as used in the statute were designed to have and did have but a like
significance.”). See also BORK, supra note 46, at 34. Though not explicitly
stated, the three-part test in Standard Oil comprises: the “[1] inherent nature or
[2] effect of the restraint, as well as [3] the evident purpose of the acts . . . .” Id.
at 36.
103
BORK, supra note 46, at 36.
104
Id.
105
Id. at 18–19, 36 (“Behavior not placed in the per se category is properly
judged by the criteria of the intent which accompanies it and its probable effect
upon competition.”).
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rule-of-reason jurisprudence over the next century.106
This traditional three-part test also laid the foundation for
Justice Brandeis’ quintessential opinion in Board of Trade of City
of Chicago v. United States.107 The case concerned the Board of
Trade’s prohibition on grain sales between certain hours of the
day.108 Because the prices of grains temporarily remained constant,
the effect of this conduct amounted to a limited type of price
fixing.109 The Court, nonetheless, sustained the restriction on the
grain sales.110 Justice Brandeis, expanding upon the rule of reason
proffered earlier by Justices White and Taft, found that price fixing
could sometimes improve market conditions.111 He then articulated
what many have called the “classic formulation of the rule of
reason:”112
[T]he legality of an agreement or regulation cannot
be determined by so simple a test, as whether it
restrains competition. Every agreement concerning
trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind,
to restrain, is of their very essence. The true test of
legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as
merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes
106

See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 762
(1984) (emphasizing “market impact” and “economic effect” of restraint);
Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19 (1979)
(focusing “on whether the effect . . . threaten[s] the proper operation of our
predominantly free-market economy”); Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,
433 U.S. 36, 58–59 (1977) (“[D]eparture from the rule-of-reason standard must
be based upon demonstrable economic effect . . . .”); Appalachian Coals, Inc. v.
United States, 288 U.S. 344, 368 (1933) (“The more serious question relates to
the effect of the plan upon competition between defendants and other
producers.”), overruled by Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467
U.S. 752 (1984); Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918)
(under the rule of reason, courts must examine “the nature of the restraint and its
effect, actual or probable”).
107
Bd. of Trade of Chi., 246 U.S. at 231.
108
Id. at 237, 239–40.
109
Leslie, supra note 18, at 260–61.
110
Bd. of Trade of Chi., 246 U.S. at 241.
111
BORK, supra note 46, at 43.
112
Piraino, Making Sense of the Rule of Reason, supra note 76, at 1761.
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competition or whether it is such as may suppress or
even destroy competition. To determine that
question the court must ordinarily consider the facts
peculiar to the business to which the restraint is
applied; its condition before and after the restraint
was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its
effect, actual or probable. The history of the
restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for
adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end
sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is
not because a good intention will save an otherwise
objectionable regulation or the reverse; but because
knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret
facts and to predict consequences.113
This passage is important for several reasons. First, it promotes
the ancillary restraint doctrine articulated by Taft and described
above. Like Taft and White, Brandeis knew “that restraints on
competition may often be a valuable and integral part of business
arrangements, and that not all restraints should be condemned.”114
Second, by allowing courts to sustain arrangements that benefit the
market, Brandeis also helped flesh out the standard three-prong
economic-effects test introduced by White.115 Compared to
previous versions of the rule of reason, Brandeis’ analysis was
especially fact-intensive. His analysis permitted courts to look
beyond competition and to consider circumstances peculiar to the
industry in question. While the opinion did not explicitly reject a
per se illegal category of conduct, at least one commentator has
noted its absence from the text.116 Taken as a whole, the Board of
Trade decision suggests that Brandeis favored a presumption of
113

Bd. of Trade of Chi., 246 U.S. at 238.
Gavil, supra note 74, at 742.
115
See id. at 742–43 (“[The Chicago Board opinion] intuitively focused on
the issues that lie at the core of the rule of reason inquiry and always have: the
nature of the conduct, its purpose, and, perhaps most importantly, ‘its effect[s],
actual or probable.’”) (citation omitted).
116
BORK, supra note 46, at 44 (“Most significant, perhaps, is his entire
omission of any suggestion that there exists any category of restraints illegal per
se.”).
114
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reasonableness.117
B. The Pitfalls of Early Antitrust Law and Their Effect Today
Justice Hughes’ 1911 opinion in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John
D. Park & Sons Co.118 exemplifies the Court’s frustrating tendency
to undermine whatever progress it has made toward promoting a
consistent rule of reason. Wishing to prevent price-cutting, Dr.
Miles, a manufacturer of patent medicines, entered into an agency
pricing agreement with its distributors.119 Through this
arrangement, Dr. Miles was able to maintain uniform retail prices
for its products.120 Thus, this vertical retail-price restraint’s only
real economic effect was to prevent predatory pricing by
distributors. The Supreme Court, however, viewed the vertical
arrangement as a per se violation of the Sherman Act.121 Justice
Hughes stated that Dr. Miles “can fare no better with its plan of
identical contracts than could the dealers themselves if they formed
a combination and endeavored to establish the same restrictions,
and thus to achieve the same result, by agreement with each
other.”122 The Court thus effectively conflated horizontal price
arrangements with vertical retail-price arrangements,123 punishing
117

Under a presumption of reasonableness, the government must
demonstrate a restraint’s negative effect on the market before it could be deemed
illegal. See id. at 46.
118
Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911),
overruled by Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877
(2007).
119
Id. at 374–93.
120
Id. at 374–75.
121
Id. at 400–09.
122
Id. at 408.
123
Judge Posner points out, with some dismay, that the Court justifies its
odd theory with the bald assertion: “[t]hat these agreements restrain trade is
obvious.” Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An
Analysis of the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential
Competition Decisions, 75 COL. L. REV. 282, 286 (1975) [hereinafter Posner,
Antitrust Policy] (internal quotation marks omitted). The injury done by Dr.
Miles is, of course, not “obvious.” Like too much antitrust law, the Court’s
disapproval of vertical arrangements—along with price-fixing and horizontal
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the manufacturer Dr. Miles for precluding retailers from selling its
products at below-cost prices. The law of vertical retail-price
maintenance was thereby “rendered mischievous and arbitrary”124
and would not be remedied until Leegin Creative Leather
Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc. finally overruled Dr. Miles in 2007.125
Even so, antitrust policy today sometimes seems just as
muddled as it did in 1911. In United States v. Apple, Inc., for
example, the DOJ charged publishers with entering an “illegal
agreement” precluding predatory pricing.126 This appears to be just
another way of railing against vertical retail-price maintenance—in
this case, the agency model—conduct that, since Leegin, should be
considered legal.127 Moreover, as a punitive measure, the District
Court prohibited publishers from setting the retail prices of their ebooks for a period of two years.128 Again, the target of the court’s
judgment is a vertical arrangement that is presumed legal. Thus,
like Dr. Miles, the Apple decision undermines manufacturers’
ability to protect their products from predatory pricing by retailers.
Held side by side, Dr. Miles and Apple, Inc. appear eerily similar
to one another; both cases reveal the courts’ conflation of
horizontal and vertical restraints, as well as their continuing—but
unfounded—contempt for effective vertical retail-price restraints.
arrangements—rests on various misperceptions. See also BORK, supra note 46,
at 16 (“Never has ‘experience’ demonstrated the anticompetitive nature of any
of these practices.”).
124
BORK, supra note 46, at 32.
125
Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 882
(2007). Much like Dr. Miles, the Leegin case concerned a manufacturer that
restricted the prices at which retailers could sell its goods by refusing to sell its
products to those retailers that did not abide by the vertical retail-price restraint.
Id. at 883. Instead of finding this type of vertical price restraint illegal, however,
the Court declared “[w]e now hold that Dr. Miles should be overruled and that
vertical price restraints are to be judged by the rule of reason.” Id. at 882.
126
Competitive Impact Statement, supra note 10, at 8.
127
That vertical and horizontal restraints lead to the same outcome, yet one
is still considered legal while the other is not, should tell us something about the
uncertainty inherent in antitrust policy.
128
See Final Judgment as to Defendants Hachette, Harper Collins, and
Simon & Schuster at 10, United States v. Apple, Inc., 889 F. Supp. 2d 623
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 12 Civ. 2826).
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By ruling against the book publishers simply because their agency
model “achieve[d] the same result”129 as retailer collusion, the
District Court made the same mistake committed by the Supreme
Court in Dr. Miles a hundred years ago.
Cases like Dr. Miles are instructive. They reveal that the
Supreme Court has made some poor decisions resulting in shaky
distinctions between cause and effect, evincing an infirm
understanding of modern economic theory. These decisions have
hobbled other courts as they handle cases like Apple, Inc. Yet,
strangely, the problematic history of antitrust law is a cause for
optimism. Cases like Leegin show that old errors can be resolved,
and, moreover, that the Sherman Act “has a generality and
adaptability comparable to that found to be desirable in
constitutional provisions.”130 This means that the law is apt to
improve; courts can rid themselves of some old bugaboos (like
discomfort with retail-price restraints) and, as a result, United
States v. Apple, Inc. can be properly resolved.
II. TWO POSITIVE TRENDS IN MODERN ANTITRUST LAW
The Court has increasingly begun to recognize economic
efficiency as the true measure of antitrust policy.131 This is
129

Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 408
(1911), overruled by Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551
U.S. 877 (2007).
130
Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 360 (1933). See
also Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 64 (1911) (noting that
the Sherman Act was “expressly designed not to unduly limit the application of
the act by precise definition, but, while clearly fixing a standard, that is, by
defining the ulterior boundaries which could not be transgressed with impunity,
to leave it to be determined by the light of reason, guided by the principles of
law and the duty to apply and enforce the public policy embodied in the statute,
in every given case whether any particular act or contract was within the
contemplation of the statute.”); Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Reconciling the Harvard
and Chicago Schools: A New Antitrust Approach for the 21st Century, 82 IND.
L.J. 345, 346 (2007) [hereinafter Piraino, Reconciling Harvard and Chicago
Schools] (“Over the 115 years since the adoption of the Sherman Act, the courts
and enforcement agencies have altered their interpretation of the antitrust laws
to match prevailing economic assumptions.”).
131
Leslie, supra note 18, at 244.
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underscored by two important trends that have emerged in modern
antitrust law. The first constitutes a steady move away from per se
illegality and toward the traditional economic-effects test under the
rule of reason.132 The second trend is a growing realization that
market competition is not the only indicator of the successful
application of antitrust law. When viewed together, both trends
undermine the District Court’s decision in United States v. Apple,
Inc. Instead they indicate that the horizontal price-fixing
arrangement between publishers is indeed permissible under the
rule of reason because it increases efficiency in the e-book market.
A. The Shift from Per Se Illegality to Rule of Reason Analysis
Over time “there has been a general trend away from per se
rules toward greater application of the standard rule of reason.”133
Thus, some commentators recognize that “the rule of reason now
has become the dominant form of analysis in Section 1 cases.”134
The best explanation for this trend is the promulgation of modern
economic theory.135 Until the late 1960s, before the emergence of
the so-called Chicago School of economics, “courts were
enamored of the clarity, simplicity, and deterrent effects of per se
rules.”136 The application of the per se rule “reached its peak in
1967 when, in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., the
[Supreme] Court extended [it] to nonprice vertical restrictions
imposed by a supplier on its distributors.”137 This decision marked
the height of the mistaken belief, rooted in Dr. Miles and persistent
today, that all vertical restraints are per se illegal.
As economic theory has advanced, however, “the courts have
grown disillusioned with the absolutism of the per se rule and have
been more inclined to consider efficiency justifications for
132

See id. at 247–48.
Id.
134
Piraino, Making Sense of the Rule of Reason, supra note 76, at 1760.
135
See Leslie, supra note 18, at 289–90 (explaining that application of per
se rules became insufficient in price-fixing cases of the 1980s, leading the
Supreme Court to adopt in-depth analysis closer to rule-of-reason analysis).
136
Piraino, Making Sense of the Rule of Reason, supra note 76, at 1753–54.
137
Id. at 1756.
133
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competitive restraints.”138 For example, the modern Supreme Court
has noted that per se analysis “may sometimes prohibit restraints of
trade that are harmless, efficient, competitive, or otherwise
beneficial.”139 Even outspoken proponents of the per se rule have
conceded that it may have outlived its usefulness,140 as a rule that
is meant to be applied indiscriminately loses its value whenever it
does not produce the correct result. Consequently, “the courts have
narrowed the scope of the per se rule and expanded applications of
the rule of reason.”141 Rather than using a hatchet to carve out
antitrust policy, courts now prefer a scalpel: an economic-effects
test based on the tests articulated by Justices White and
Brandeis.142 To put it another way, “if the goal of the per se rule
[was] to avoid discussion of economic efficiencies, it has
failed.”143 The retreat away from per se analysis is nicely
demonstrated by the Supreme Court’s gradual disavowal of the
reasoning in Dr. Miles.144 Not only does this suggest that the Court
138

Id. at 1754.
Leslie, supra note 18, at 246 & n.13 (“The administrative efficiency
interests in antitrust regulation are unusually compelling.” (quoting F.T.C. v.
Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 430 (1990))).
140
Professor Bork, for instance, concedes that while it has done some good,
“it is also true that the [per se] rule has become somewhat skewed over time, and
on occasion produces undesirable results.” BORK, supra note 46, at 263.
141
Piraino, Making Sense of the Rule of Reason, supra note 76, at 1754.
142
See Gavil, supra note 74, at 734 (“The rule of reason has evolved
considerably since Standard Oil and Chicago Board of Trade, largely due to the
Court’s own march away from per se rules and undemanding burdens of proof.
As that march began in the late 1970s, the Court moved to add contemporary
economic content to the broad principles articulated in Chicago Board of Trade.
In formative cases like Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.; National
Society of Professional Engineers v. United States; Broadcast Music, Inc. v.
CBS; and NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, the modern
era’s rule of reason was honed to focus on specific, core economic concepts,
especially anticompetitive effect and efficiency.”).
143
Leslie, supra note 18, at 290.
144
See United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 488 (1926)
(circumventing Dr. Miles to approve a genuine agency model); White Motor Co.
v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 265–66 (1963) (finding that per se analysis of
vertical restraints is justified only when the Court possesses a long-held
understanding of the market); Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S.
139
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has begun to favor the rule of reason, but also that it recognizes
horizontal and vertical arrangements may have very different
causes and effects. Even though antitrust law has seen an ongoing
“erosion of the per se rule,”145 a further extension of the rule of
reason is required to account for instances of beneficial horizontal
price arrangements such as the one in United States v. Apple, Inc.
This rule-of-reason analysis must depart from earlier models by
taking into account, among other factors, the benefits of economic
efficiency.
B. Market Efficiency as the Best Indicator of Consumer
Welfare
The incorrect notion that competition alone should guide
antitrust law is deeply ingrained in the earliest antitrust cases.146 In
Standard Oil, for instance, the Supreme Court held that only
“anticompetitive” arrangements are invalid under the Sherman
Act.147 “Consequently, the effect on competition soon became the
primary, if not sole, focus determining the reasonableness of a

36, 57 (1977) (reversing Schwinn and finding that non-price vertical
arrangements are better judged by the rule of reason); Leegin Creative Leather
Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 889 (2007) (finding that “it is
necessary to examine, in the first instance, the economic effects of vertical
agreements to fix minimum resale prices[,] and to determine whether the per se
rule is nonetheless appropriate.”).
145
Piraino, Making Sense of the Rule of Reason, supra note 76, at 1757–58.
146
See Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 97 (1911);
Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370, 375 (7th Cir.
1986); see also BORK, supra note 46, at 7 (“There are many problems here, but
perhaps the core of the difficulty is that the courts, and particularly the Supreme
Court, have failed to understand and give proper weight to the crucial concept of
business efficiency.”).
147
Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 58 (“Without going into detail, and but very
briefly surveying the whole field, it may be with accuracy said that the dread of
enhancement of prices and of other wrongs which it was thought would flow
from the undue limitation on competitive conditions caused by contracts or other
acts of individuals or corporations led, as a matter of public policy, to the
prohibition or treating as illegal all contracts or acts which were unreasonably
restrictive of competitive conditions . . . .”).
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challenged trade restraint.”148 This misperception has guided
antitrust policy for the last hundred years, but no longer is it
blindly accepted.149 Courts now realize that market efficiency is a
relevant measure of antitrust policy and the best way to promote
consumer welfare.150
Only recently has economic theory considered the idea that
efficiency is the goal of antitrust law.151 This theory arises from the
Chicago School, which Judges Bork and Posner first applied to
antitrust law in the 1970s.152 According to the Chicago School,
efficiency is the chief object of the Sherman Act.153 “Because
efficiency is the maximization of social utility, the Chicago
School’s standard is often called the ‘consumer welfare’
standard.”154 Thus, the efficiency standard, by maximizing
consumer welfare, is aligned with the true goal of the Sherman
Act.155
According to the Chicago School, competition and efficiency
are not synonymous: in fact, competition can sometimes be
148

Leslie, supra note 18, at 245.
Id. at 244.
150
Id.
151
See Gavil, supra note 74, at 735 (“The various frameworks of the new
rules of reason are all animated by a common purpose: to differentiate
anticompetitive from efficient conduct . . . . In application, these ‘new rules of
reason’ have more economic content and more of a defined legal framework
than did the seemingly more abstract Standard Oil and Chicago Board of Trade
approach.”).
152
See generally BORK, supra note 46; POSNER, supra note 66; Robert H.
Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market
Division II, 75 YALE L. REV. 373 (1965); Posner, Antitrust Policy, supra note
123.
153
Leslie, supra note 18, at 250. See also BORK, supra note 46, at xi.
154
Leslie, supra note 18, at 251.
155
See BORK, supra note 46, at 78, 262. Bork contends that “the only
legitimate goal of antitrust is the maximization of consumer welfare,” so that
“[t]he responsibility of the federal courts for the integrity and virtue of law
requires that they take consumer welfare as the sole value that guides decisions.”
Id. at 51. Moreover, Bork warns that “[w]hen efficiency is not counted, or when
it is seen as a positive evil, it appears that no business structure of behavior has
any potential for social good, and there is consequently no reason to uphold its
legality if any remote danger can be imagined.” Id. at 8.
149
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inefficient.156 This is because while efficiency is an end in itself,
competition is just one possible means of achieving it.157
Businesses often enhance their efficiency more effectively by
collaborating with—and thus by limiting their competition with—
other businesses.158 Courts that persist in elevating competition
over efficiency are therefore guilty of overemphasizing the means
and shortchanging the real end of antitrust law: consumer
welfare.159 If the purpose of antitrust laws is to preserve market
efficiency, sometimes competition must be set aside. Otherwise, a
“blind obedience to competition is simply bad economics.”160
The Supreme Court has previously questioned the sanctity of
relying only on the competition standard. In Northern Securities
Co. v. United States,161 Justice Holmes dissented: “The court
below argued as if maintaining competition were the expressed
object of the act. The act says nothing about competition.”162 Like
Taft in Addyston Pipe, Holmes argued that it is lawful to abolish
competition in the service of efficiency.163 Justice Brandeis, in
156

Leslie, supra note 18, at 271.
Professor Bork distinguishes competition from efficiency by stating that
the former “is inherently a process in which rivals seek to exclude one another,”
while efficiency “tends to exclude firms that are less efficient.” BORK, supra
note 46, at 49. Moreover, Judge Posner has held that the emphasis of antitrust
has shifted from “the protection of competition as a process of rivalry to the
protection of competition as a means of promoting economic efficiency.”
Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370, 375 (7th Cir.
1986). See also Leslie, supra note 18, at 255 (“Competition and allocative
efficiency . . . maintain a strict means-end relationship. Competition is a means
to achieve allocative efficiency.”).
158
Piraino, Making Sense of the Rule of Reason, supra note 76, at 1768.
159
Leslie, supra note 18, at 271.
160
Id.
161
N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
162
Id. at 403.
163
Id. at 406. (“[Section 1], taken alone, does not require that all existing
competitions shall be maintained. It does not look primarily, if at all, to
competition. It simply requires that a party’s freedom in trade between the states
shall not be cut down by contract with a stranger. So far as that phrase goes, it is
lawful to abolish competition by any form of union.”). Similarly, Judge Taft
held that “to be ancillary, and hence lawful, an agreement eliminating
competition must be subordinate and collateral to a separate, legitimate
157
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Chicago Board, offered the pithiest refutation of competition,
stating simply, “the legality of an agreement or regulation cannot
be determined by so simple a test, as whether it restrains
competition.”164
Today, some lower courts and commentators recognize that
efficiency is the “appropriate objective when analyzing antitrust
issues.”165 Although the Supreme Court has been slow in coming
around, key cases demonstrate its willingness to consider
efficiency.166 For instance, in Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United
States, a case concerning the struggling coal industry, the Court
upheld the manufacturers’ restraint on prices on efficiency
grounds.167 Similarly, in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania,
the Court found that non-price vertical restrictions168 limiting the
number of franchise retailers that sold Sylvania’s electronic
products were legal when they allowed “the manufacturer to
transaction.” BORK, supra note 46, at 27. This occurred when “the elimination
of competition was a means of creating efficiency.” Id. at 264.
164
Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 244 (1918).
165
Leslie, supra note 18, at 252 (“[C]ourts, commentators, and even critics
have more or less reached a consensus that efficiency is the appropriate
objective when analyzing anti-trust issues.”).
166
For examples of cases in which the Supreme Court has deemed
considerations of efficiency irrelevant to antitrust law, see Socony-Vacuum Oil
Co. v. United States, 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940) (“Whatever economic
justification particular to price-fixing agreements may be thought to have, the
law does not permit an inquiry into their reasonableness.”); Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l
Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978) (finding that the rule of
reason “is not to decide whether a policy of favoring competition is in the public
interest”).
167
Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933),
overruled by Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752
(1984). Much like the Apple case, Appalachian Coals concerned a group of
struggling producers (in this case, coal producers rather than book publishers)
who instituted price restraints on their products in order to improve the
efficiency of the market.
168
Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 37 (1977)
(describing the central vertical non-price restraint as follows: “Franchise
agreements between manufacturers and retailers . . . includ[ed] provisions
barring the retailers from selling franchised products from certain locations other
than those specified in the agreements.”).
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achieve certain efficiencies in the distribution of his products.”169
Additionally, in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcast
Systems, a television network brought an antitrust action against
music licensors, claiming that the model under which the licensors
set fees for blanket licenses to perform musical compositions
constituted illegal price fixing.170 Nonetheless, the Court sustained
the horizontal restraint because it would “increase economic
efficiency.”171 Indeed, many federal appellate courts have already
recognized that efficiency is the goal of antitrust law, and
competition simply a means to that end.172 However, the Supreme
Court has not yet followed suit. “[T]he Court must do more than
merely acknowledge the means-end relationship between
competition and . . . efficiency.”173 In order to ensure maximization
of consumer welfare, courts must adopt efficiency as the primary
goal of antitrust policy.

169

Id. at 57. Much like the book publishers in the Apple case, Sylvania
abandoned the wholesale model for a franchise sales model permitting it to pick
which retailers sold its products and under what terms sales were to be
conducted. See id. at 38–39.
170
Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
171
Id. at 20. The Court noted the importance of considering whether a price
restraint tends to “threaten the proper operation of our predominantly freemarket economy” or whether it is “one designed to ‘increase economic
efficiency and render markets more, rather than less, competitive.’” Id. As we
will see, the publishers’ price restraints in the Apple case both promoted the
proper operation of the market and made it more competitive, namely by ending
Amazon’s monopoly and allowing Apple to enter the e-book market.
172
Leslie, supra note 18, at 255. See also Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v.
W. Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370, 375 (7th Cir. 1986); Rothery Storage & Van
Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
173
Leslie, supra note 18, at 274.
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III. HORIZONTAL ARRANGEMENTS PROMOTING EFFICIENCY ARE
SUBJECT TO THE RULE OF REASON
It is no longer a viable policy for courts and regulators to
consider horizontal price-fixing the “epitome of a per se
violation.”174 As we have seen, the Sherman Act “has great
generality and adaptability.”175 Antitrust law is apt to change as the
courts extend the rule of reason to conduct once presumed
illegal.176 The Supreme Court has already adjusted its policy
regarding vertical restraints; it overruled Dr. Miles and recognized
that retail-price maintenance is subject to evaluation under the rule
of reason.177 The same adjustment must be made for horizontal
price fixing.
Supreme Court precedent supports such an argument. In
Chicago Board of Trade, the Court, for the first time, upheld an
apparent horizontal price-fixing arrangement under the rule of
reason.178 Justice Brandeis found that the result of the Board’s
price fixing “had actually been to improve market conditions.”179
Fifteen years later, in Appalachian Coals, the Court again upheld a
horizontal price-fixing arrangement.180 In that case, coal producers
174

Id. at 246. See also United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S.
150, 223 (1940) (finding per se illegal any “combination formed for the purpose
and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price
of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce.”).
175
Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359–60 (1933),
overruled by Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752
(1984).
176
See HOLMES & MANGIARACINA, supra note 65, § 2:9 (“The distinction
between practices deemed per se illegal, and those that are instead to be judged
by the rule of reason or by some intermediate standard, is anything but
immutable . . . practices that have at one time been analyzed under one test have
later been brought under an altogether different standard.”).
177
Creative Leather Prods. Inc. v. PSKS Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 908 (2007).
178
Leslie, supra note 18, at 260 (arguing that the Court sustained a
restriction that “amounted to, at the least, a variation of price-fixing”).
179
BORK, supra note 46, at 44.
180
Appalachian Coals, 288 U.S. at 378; see also Leslie, supra note 18, at
261 (“[T]he Court sustained an agreement which was, for all intents and
purposes, a horizontal price-fixing agreement.”).
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created an “exclusive selling agency” to increase coal production,
“achieve economies in marketing,” and eliminate “destructive
trade practices.”181 The Court declined to apply the per se rule,182
effectively sustaining the arrangement because it purportedly
corrected market failures in the coal industry and led to the “more
economic sale of coal.”183 Echoing Brandeis in Chicago Board of
Trade, the Court examined the “conditions peculiar to the coal
industry” when it determined the ultimate purpose and effect of the
horizontal restraint.184 The Court thereby found that the restraint
“mitigated recognized evils” unique to the industry.185 The Court
did not explicitly say as much, but an “efficiency exception to the
per se rule doctrine was being carved out.”186
Recent cases have begun to embrace the notion that economic
efficiency justifies price-setting.187 The 1970s saw the Court begin
to adjust its traditional per se approach in order to provide
defendants an occasion to explain their economic rationale for
horizontal restrictions on price.188 In the most important of these
cases, Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System,
Inc., the Court held that defendants’ price restriction on blanket
music licenses ought to be examined under a rule-of-reason
analysis.189 Tellingly, the Court noted that “easy labels do not
always supply ready answers,”190 and found that not all price
restrictions among competitors are “per se violations of the
Sherman Act or even unreasonable restraints.”191
In applying the rule of reason to the defendants’ price-fixing
scheme, the Court made two essential points. First, it held that

181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191

Appalachian Coals, 288 U.S. at 358.
Id. at 360–61; see also Leslie, supra note 18, at 262.
Appalachian Coals, 288 U.S. at 367.
Id. at 368.
Id. at 367.
Leslie, supra note 18, at 262.
Id. at 260.
Piraino, Making Sense of the Rule of Reason, supra note 76, at 1781.
Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 7 (1979).
Id. at 8.
Id. at 23.

THROWING THE E-BOOK AT PUBLISHERS

373

special attention must be paid when conditions are “sui generis”192
and therefore, that the Sherman Act should be “discriminatingly
applied in light of economic realities.”193 In this respect, Broadcast
Music, Inc. echoes early decisions194 and presages later ones195 in
requiring that the Court tailor its analysis to the relevant market.196
When the market is unique, the rule of reason is appropriate.197
Second, the Court applied the nuanced economic-effects test198 in
192

Id. at 10 (quoting Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 562 F.2d at 132).
Id. at 14 (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae on Petition
for Certiori at 10–11, K-91, Inc. v. Gershwin Publ’g Corp., 88 S.Ct. 761 (1968)
(No. 147)).
194
See Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 360 (1933)
(“[A] close and objective scrutiny of particular conditions and purposes is
necessary in each case. Realities must dominate the judgment.”); Bd. of Trade of
Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (“[T]he court must ordinarily
consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied . . .
.”).
195
See Cont’l T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977)
(“[T]he factfinder weighs all of the circumstances of a case in deciding whether
a restrictive practice should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint
on competition.”); White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 261 (1963)
(“‘[R]ule of reason’ normally requires an ascertainment of the fact peculiar to
the particular business.”).
196
See White Motor Co., 372 U.S. at 265–66 (“To gauge the
appropriateness of a per se test for the forms of restraint involved in this case,
then, we must determine whether experience warrants, at this stage, a conclusion
that inquiry into effect upon competition and economic justification would be
similarly irrelevant.”); GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. at 57 (“[V]ertical
restrictions [cannot] be conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore
illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the
business excuse for their use.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
197
As we will see, this idea is again echoed in a later district court case,
Broad. Music, Inc. v. Moor-Law, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 758, 763 (D. Del. 1981),
which stated that the “public goods” market is unique and therefore deserving of
rule-of-reason analysis. See also State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997)
(“Per se treatment is appropriate once experience with a particular kind of
restraint enables the Court to predict with confidence that the rule of reason will
condemn it. Thus, we have expressed reluctance to adopt per se rules with
regard to restraints imposed in the context of business relationships where the
economic impact of certain practices is not immediately obvious.”) (citation
omitted).
198
Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19 (1979)
193
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order to determine whether defendants’ conduct was an ancillary
agreement intended to increase economic efficiency.199 The Court
found that the “blanket license” was not a “naked restrain[t] of
trade with no purpose except stifling of competition . . . but rather
accompan[ied] the integration of sales, monitoring, and
enforcement against unauthorized copyright use.”200 Thus,
Broadcast Music, Inc. instructs courts to look beyond competition
to whether the arrangement creates an efficiency to which a pricerestraint is ancillary. “In other words, the issue is whether the price
fixing ‘achieve[s] purposes unrelated to price formation.’”201
Two later decisions also applied the rule of reason to horizontal
restraints. In National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of
Regents of the University of Oklahoma, members of the NCAA
limited the number of college football games that could be
broadcast during a given athletic season, effectively restraining
“the ability of member institutions to compete in terms of price and
output.”202 The Court once again applied an economic-effects test
and considered the unique nature of the relevant market.203 It found
that the quality of the NCAA’s “product” (i.e., college football as a
commercial product) could not be preserved “except by mutual
agreement,” and that the NCAA played a “vital role” in preserving

(“[O]ur inquiry must focus on whether the effect and, here because it tends to
show effect . . . the purpose of the practice are to threaten the proper operation
of our predominantly free-market economy . . . .”).
199
Id. at 20. See also Leslie, supra note 18, at 264–65 (“[T]he [BMI] Court
acknowledged that competition is not the sole objective of the Sherman Act.
Rather, there are times when competition must give way to productive efficiency
concerns.”).
200
Broad. Music, 441 U.S. at 20 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
201
Nat’l Bancard Corp. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 779 F.2d 592, 599 (11th Cir.
1986) (quoting United States v. S. Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc., 672
F.2d 469, 479 (5th Cir. 1982)).
202
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468
U.S. 85, 103 (1984).
203
Id. at 104 n.26 (“Per se rules may require considerable inquiry into
market conditions before the evidence justifies a presumption of anticompetitive
conduct.”).
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the integrity and character of the product.204 As in previous cases,
the Court was guided by an interest in promoting economic
efficiency.205 This principle appeared again in F.T.C. v. Indiana
Federation of Dentists.206 Here an affiliation of dentists agreed to
withhold certain records from insurance-claims examiners, who
used the records to determine whether payment should be made on
claims.207 Eventually, the Federal Trade Commission brought suit
against the federation of dentists, claiming that its withholding
documents amounted to “an unfair method of competition.”208 The
Court noted that while the dentists’ conduct did resemble a “group
boycott,” which the Court had in the past found “unlawful under
the per se rule,” the Court here declined to apply the per se
analysis.209 Instead, the Court employed the rule-of-reason
standard210 and, as in previous cases, held that economic efficiency
may justify anticompetitive restraints.211
The prenominate cases, from Chicago Board to Indiana
Federation of Dentists, support the proposition that the Supreme
Court, like other federal courts, has begun to carve out an
exception to the per se rule recognizing the benefit of certain
horizontal price arrangements. Specifically, the Court seems more
likely to apply the traditional rule of reason when a horizontal
arrangement corrects a market failure in a unique industry and thus
acts as an ancillary agreement intended to increase overall
204

Id. at 102. It may be easily argued that book publishers play an identical
role in preserving the character and quality of their products: books. Amazon
may threaten to replace publishers—but Amazon is, above all else, a consumergoods retailer. There is much reason to doubt Amazon’s ability to produce
quality books when it is more interested in selling home goods and electronics.
205
See Leslie, supra note 18, at 266 (arguing that “the Court in NCAA took
a price-fixing scheme out of the per se category because of the potential for
productive efficiency”); Piraino, Making Sense of the Rule of Reason, supra note
76, at 1758 (noting that in NCAA “the Supreme Court extended the rule of
reason to other horizontal agreements with potential efficiency justifications”).
206
F.T.C. v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
207
Id. at 449.
208
Id. at 451–52.
209
Id. at 457–60.
210
Id. at 459.
211
See Leslie, supra note 18, at 266.
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economic efficiency.
IV. THE APPEALS COURT SHOULD APPLY A NEW THREE-PRONG
ECONOMIC-EFFECTS TEST TO UNITED STATES V. APPLE, INC.
As argued by Professor Leslie, the “net effect” of the
prenominate decisions “is that the per se rule against horizontal
price-fixing is not intact.”212 In conjunction with one another, these
cases suggest that a horizontal price arrangement may be legal
under the rule of reason when the relevant market is unique,213 the
restraint is ancillary to a proper agreement,214 and when the
agreement promotes economic efficiency.215 Thus, on appeal, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit should evaluate
United States v. Apple, Inc. not only under the rule of reason, but
more specifically under a new three-part economic-effects test
reflecting, in the most concise way possible, the above precedent.
This test differs from the traditional test in two ways. First, unlike
the current rule-of-reason analysis, it would be uniformly applied
to instances of horizontal arrangements. Second, the new test
would replace the more general inquiries of the traditional test,
which typically includes “inherent nature,” “inherent effect,” and
“evident purpose” prongs.216 Under this new test, the court would
instead consider whether (1) the publishing industry and e-book
212

Id. at 267.
See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997); Broad. Music, Inc. v.
Columbia Broad Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 10 (1979); Cont’l T. V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977); White Motor Co. v. United States, 372
U.S. 253, 261 (1963); Broad. Music, Inc. v. Moor-Law, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 758,
763 (D. Del. 1981).
214
See Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. at 20; Nat’l Bancard Corp. v.
Visa U.S.A., Inc., 779 F.2d 592, 599 (11th Cir. 1986) (quoting United States v.
S. Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc., 672 F.2d 469, 479 (5th Cir. 1982)).
215
See F.T.C. v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986); Na’'l
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 103
(1984); Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. at 1; Appalachian Coals, Inc. v.
United States 288 U.S. 344 (1933), overruled by Copperweld Corp. v.
Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984); Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United
States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
216
See supra notes 102–06 and accompanying text.
213
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market are unique or unfamiliar; (2) the publishers’ price restraint
was ancillary to the creation of a proper agency model; and (3) the
arrangement improved efficiency and promoted consumer
welfare.217 This standard is not derived from thin air; rather, it is a
formalization of modern economics and myriad case law. Because
the price-fixing arrangement between book publishers in United
States v. Apple, Inc. satisfies these requirements, the Second
Circuit should find it legal under the rule of reason.
A. Under the Sui Generis Prong the E-Book Market is Unique
Under the first prong of the proposed test, the court would
determine whether the e-book market is unique. As discussed
above, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to apply the per se
rule when dealing with a unique economic market or an industry
with which the judiciary lacks experience.218 The Court has held
217

HOLMES & MANGIARACINA, supra note 65, § 2:11.
See supra notes 192–97 and accompanying text. See also State Oil Co.
v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) (“Per se treatment is appropriate once experience
with a particular kind of restraint enables the Court to predict with confidence
that the rule of reason will condemn it. Thus, we have expressed reluctance to
adopt per se rules with regard to restraints imposed in the context of business
relationships where the economic impact of certain practices is not immediately
obvious.”) (citation omitted); Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc.,
441 U.S. 1, 10–14 (1979) (When market conditions are “sui generis,” the
Sherman Act should be “discriminatingly applied in light of economic
realities.”); Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57–59 (1977)
(Vertical restrictions cannot be “conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and
therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have
caused or the business excuse for their use.”) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted); White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 265–66 (1963)
(“To gauge the appropriateness of a per se test for the forms of restraint involved
in this case, then, we must determine whether experience warrants, at this stage,
a conclusion that inquiry into effect upon competition and economic justification
would be similarly irrelevant.”); Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288
U.S. 344, 361 (1933) (“It is therefore necessary in this instance to consider the
economic conditions peculiar to the coal industry . . . .”), overruled by
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984); Bd. of
Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (“To determine that
question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to
which the restraint is applied . . . .”); Broad. Music, Inc., v. Moor-Law, Inc., 527
218
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instead that when market conditions are “sui generis,”219 the
Sherman Act should be “discriminatingly applied in light of
economic realities.”220 Because the e-book market is highly
unusual, the publishers’ horizontal arrangement is best evaluated
pursuant to the rule of reason. Under the rule of reason, publishers
would have the opportunity to explain their rationale for a
horizontal restriction on price.221
The e-book market is unique for three reasons. First, e-books
are “public goods” defined by two basic characteristics.222 First,
“unlike private goods (e.g., apples), one can use a public good
without leaving any less for others to consume.”223 Because ebooks are electronic files downloaded by consumers, they can be
purchased and read indefinitely without ever going out of print.224
Thus, one person downloading an e-book has no effect on
another’s ability to purchase the same title. In economic terms,
once an e-book file is created, the marginal cost of additional
consumption is near zero.225 “The second characteristic of a public
good is that it is difficult to exclude persons who do not pay from
using the good.”226 Just as piracy was once a critical concern for
the music industry, it now threatens book publishers.227 This is
largely because e-books are small files that can be downloaded

F. Supp. 758, 763–765 (D. Del. 1981) (holding that the “public goods” market is
unique and therefore deserving of rule-of-reason analysis).
219
Columbia Broad., 441 U.S. at 10.
220
Id. at 14 (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae on Petition
for Certiori at 10–11, K-91, Inc. v. Gershwin Pub’g Corp., 372 F.2d 1, 5 (9th
Cir. 1967) ( No. 20074)).
221
Piraino, Making Sense of the Rule of Reason, supra note 76, at 1781.
222
Moor-Law, Inc., 527 F. Supp. at 763.
223
Id.
224
See Rave Uno, Why Will eBooks Replace Traditional Books?, BUZZLE
(May 16, 2012), http://www.buzzle.com/articles/why-ebooks-will-replacetraditional-books.html.
225
Cf. Moor-Law, 527 F. Supp. at 763.
226
Id.
227
See Rob Reid, What To Do When Attacked by Pirates: Music, Books
and Online Piracy, WALL ST. J. (June 1, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052702303552104577438212250619458.html.
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easily.228 Indeed, at least one study has shown a rise in e-book
piracy as the number of e-reader platforms has increased.229 Today,
“[c]ountless unlicensed e-books can be found online, and millions
of people use them.”230 The indefinite supply of e-books, along
with low marginal costs and increasing demand for pirated files,
has ramifications for the e-book market. In short, the “public
goods” status of e-books means that “the natural market forces of
supply and demand do not operate normally on pricing . . . .”231
Second, the e-book industry is unique because e-books are not
interchangeable goods. In a typical antitrust case, a market
comprises products, such as widgets, that have “reasonable
interchangeability.”232 Two products are interchangeable when
there is sufficient “cross-elasticity of demand”233—that is, when
“consumers would respond to a slight increase in the price of one
product by switching to another product.”234 But in the e-book
market, cross-elasticity does not always exist. This is because each
book publisher possesses a unique catalog of specific authors, and
authors are not interchangeable.235 Unlike widgets, most authors
228

See David Carnoy, Kindle E-book Piracy Accelerates, CNET (Feb. 18,
2011), http://reviews.cnet.com/8301-18438_7-20033437-82.html (“E-books are
small files and 2,500 of them can be packed into a single download (Torrent)
that’s only about 3.4GB.”).
229
See David Carnoy, New Study Suggests e-Book Piracy is on the Rise,
CNET (Oct. 6, 2010), http://news.cnet.com/8301-17938_105-20018831-1.html.
Technology company Attributor released a second study in 2010, which
indicated a fifty percent increase in online searches for pirated downloads
throughout 2010, a twenty percent increase in demand for pirated downloads
since the iPad became available in May 2010, and fifty-four percent increase in
pirated e-book demand between August 2009 and October 2010. Id.
230
Reid, supra note 227.
231
Moor-Law, Inc., 527 F. Supp. at 764 (finding that the public-good status
of musical compositions rendered typical supply-and-demand analysis
inapplicable).
232
AD/SAT v. Assoc. Press, 181 F.3d 216, 227 (2d Cir. 1999).
233
Id.
234
Id.
235
One might argue, of course, that there is little difference between
authors of bestselling potboilers or generic legal thrillers. But such an
assessment overlooks the phenomenon of “reader loyalty.” As anyone who has a
favorite writer knows, there is no substitute for a unique voice. A reader
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can be easily differentiated: they write books with a particular
style, theme, or subject matter.236 If consumers wish to read an
author’s new book, they can purchase it only from the author’s
exclusive publisher. Should that publisher wish to increase the
book’s price, consumers are seldom able to purchase an
“interchangeable” item from a competitor. Moreover, many
readers, loyal to a particular author, would simply prefer to
purchase a desired book at a slightly higher price than to buy
another book at a slightly lower price. Again, because there is less
cross-elasticity in the e-book market, the standard forces of supply
and demand do not function as they would in a more elastic
market.
Finally, the e-book market is unique because book publishers
(manufacturers) maintain a peculiar dual-relationship with Amazon
(a distributor and manufacturer). Beginning with its launch in
1995, Amazon has always operated as a book retailer.237 Amazon’s
website began by selling deeply discounted print books to its
online customers.238 In November 2007, Amazon started selling ebooks on its Kindle device as well.239 Throughout this period,
Amazon maintained a typical—if somewhat strained—relationship
with book publishers: the publishers manufactured books, and
Amazon sold them. This changed in October 2011, however, when
Amazon launched its own New York publishing arm.240 By hiring
enamored of the author George Saunders, for example, will scoff at the notion
that he is “interchangeable” with another contemporary writer. This is one
reason that popular authors are able to attract and maintain a loyal readership
while others are not. Indeed, having a unique voice is, in large part, what makes
an author marketable in the first place.
236
Works of fiction, from Homer’s Odyssey to Joyce’s Ulysses, are unique,
inimitable artworks. Non-fiction books, too, often contain unique factual
information or analysis not found elsewhere.
237
BRANDT, supra note 1, at 69, 82.
238
Id. at 82.
239
Id. at 139.
240
David Streitfeld, Amazon Signs Up Authors, Writing Book Publishers
Out of Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/
17/technology/amazon-rewrites-the-rules-of-book-publishing.html [hereinafter
Streitfeld, Amazon Signs Up Authors]. In October 2010, before the official
launch of its publishing arm, Amazon had already begun to offer royalties of
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editors, wooing authors, and producing original print and e-books,
Amazon became both a manufacturer and distributor.241 Thus,
operating simultaneously as the publishers’ distributor and, oddly,
as their competitor,242 Amazon encroached on services typically
provided by traditional publishers.243 This created an
unprecedented set of circumstances that continues to pose an
existential threat to publishers.244 Because Amazon is the primary
seventy “percent to authors who self-publish[ed] through the Kindle store.”
BRANDT, supra note 1, at 144.
241
Amazon published 122 books during its inaugural season. See Streitfeld,
Amazon Signs Up Authors, supra note 240. In June 2012, the company
purchased Avalon Books, a small publisher with a backlist of 3,000 titles. See
Julie Bosman, Amazon Buys Avalon Books, Publisher in Romance
and Mysteries, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2012, 5:46 PM), http://mediadecoder.blogs.
nytimes.com/2012/06/04/amazon-buys-avalon-books-publisher-in-romance-andmysteries/ [hereinafter Bosman, Amazon Buys Avalon Books].
242
The DOJ, in its Competitive Impact Statement, fails to acknowledge
Amazon’s dual role as retailer and manufacturer. Rather, the government treats
Amazon as a pure retailer. See Competitive Impact Statement, supra note 10, at
13. To wit, the government proposes prohibiting publishers from retaliating
should Amazon again decide to sell their e-books at a deeply discounted price.
See id. But this is unrealistic, as Amazon is not only a retailer but a book
publisher, i.e., a direct competitor of the settling defendants. The DOJ’s
prohibition is thus akin to allowing Random House to sell Macmillan’s e-books
at $0.01 per copy, while depriving Macmillan of any competitive recourse. The
inverse of this peculiar relationship may be seen in Amazon’s strained
relationship with traditional book retailers like Barnes & Noble. Now that
Amazon is a publisher as well as a distributor, Barnes & Noble has begun
refusing to carry Amazon’s print books. See David Streitfeld, Booksellers
Resisting Amazon’s Disruption, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2012), http://www.
nytimes.com/2012/11/05/technology/shunning-amazon-booksellers-resist-atransformation.html [hereinafter Streitfield, Booksellers Resisting].
243
Streitfeld, Amazon Signs Up Authors, supra note 240.
244
One may argue that chain retailers have been doing for decades what
Amazon started doing only last year. Indeed, some retail stores—e.g., Wal-mart,
Whole Foods, Target—manufacture and sell their own “store brand” consumer
products alongside the “name brands” manufactured by other companies. Like
Amazon, these retailers wear two hats: they compete with manufacturers for
market share while distributing the manufacturers’ goods. There is, however, a
fundamental difference between retail stores and Amazon: while store-brand
tissue-paper competes against name-brand tissue-paper in an elastic market
where both products are virtually interchangeable in terms of quality and
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distributor of e-books, however, individual publishers have been
unable to take competitive measures without jeopardizing the sales
of their own books.245 This double-bind, unusual among economic
markets, demands special attention from the court.246
In summary, the distinctive “public goods” status of e-books,
the unusual inelasticity of e-book demand, and Amazon’s peculiar
double-role as both retailer and manufacturer render the e-book
market sui generis. It is alarming, therefore, that Judge Cote, in her
Opinion & Order, declined to follow Supreme Court precedent and
apply the rule of reason.247 Even more surprising, while Judge
Cote acknowledged that United States v. Apple, Inc. is an unusual
case,248 she did not require the DOJ to submit even a single
economic study to support its allegations or demonstrate an
adequate understanding of the market.249 The absence of any
ingredients, Amazon seeks to create unique public goods by wooing popular
authors away from publishing houses. See, e.g., Christine Park, Name Brands vs.
Store Brands, ABC30 (Sept. 9, 2013), http://abclocal.go.com/kfsn/
story?id=9227042. The stakes are much higher. Because readers are loyal to
certain authors (i.e., authors are not interchangeable), and there is a finite
“supply” of authors, stealing authors from a publisher constitutes a substantial
blow to its business. A consumer-goods manufacturer can always improve
competition by adjusting product price, marketing strategy, quality of product,
etc. But a publishing house deprived of its bestselling authors—the product
itself—can no longer compete at all. Once drained of its most valuable resource,
a publisher will simply cease to exist.
245
When Macmillan, one of New York’s “Big Six” book publishers, first
attempted to persuade Amazon to adopt an agency pricing model in early 2010,
Amazon reacted by pulling all of Macmillan’s books from its Web site. See Brad
Stone & Motoko Rich, Amazon Removes Macmillan Books, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
30, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/30/technology/30amazon.html.
This was clearly a competitive maneuver—aimed at injuring Macmillan—given
extraordinary bite by Amazon’s status as the primary retailer of e-books.
246
The court ought to recognize that the publishers’ horizontal arrangement
was meant to mitigate the “recognized evils” of Amazon, as the coal producers
in Appalachian Coals were permitted to fend off the evils in the coal industry.
247
United States v. Apple, Inc., 889 F. Supp. 2d 623, 630–41 (S.D.N.Y.
2012).
248
Id. at 634 (“Clearly, this is no ordinary Tunney Act proceeding.”).
249
Id. at 633 (acknowledging that “the Government did not submit any
economic studies to support its allegations”).

THROWING THE E-BOOK AT PUBLISHERS

383

financial analysis or evidentiary hearing250 betrays the
government’s lack of familiarity with the complexities of the
publishing industry and the e-book market in particular. Since the
e-book market is “sufficiently unusual” and the court’s experience
“sufficiently sparse,”251 the circumstances of this case satisfy the
first prong of the new three-part economic effects test.
B. Under the Ancillary Restraint Prong the Publishers’
Horizontal Agreement is Ancillary to a Proper Agreement
Under the second prong of the proposed economic-effects test,
the court would determine whether the relevant restraint is
ancillary to a proper agreement. This analysis recalls Taft’s
decision in Addyston Pipe, whereby “showing that a restraint is
ancillary . . . lifts it out of the per se category and subjects it to the
tests of the rule of reason . . . .”252 Thus, demonstrating the
appropriateness of rule-of-reason analysis requires showing that
the restraint is ancillary to “the main purpose of a lawful
contract”253 that benefits consumers.254 This doctrine is easily
applied to the horizontal price fixing found in United States v.
Apple, Inc.255 Here, agreements between publishers to set e-book
250

Id.
Broad. Music, Inc. v. Moor-Law, Inc. 527 F. Supp. 758, 764–65 (D.
Del. 1981) (finding that when “the market is sufficiently unusual and the Court’s
experience with the challenged practice sufficiently sparse that one cannot
confidently characterize the defendants’ conduct as ‘plainly anticompetitive’ and
very likely without ‘redeeming virtue’ . . . . [T]he Rule of Reason analysis is
appropriate.”) (citation omitted).
252
BORK, supra note 46, at 267.
253
United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 282 (6th Cir.
1898), aff’d as modified, Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S.
211 (1899).
254
Id. at 281 (“Contracts for the partial restraint of trade are upheld, not
because they are advantageous to the individual with whom the contract is
made, and a sacrifice pro tanto of the rights of the community, but because it is
for the benefit of the public at large that they should be enforced.”) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).
255
See BORK, supra note 46, at 264 (“The legal doctrine necessary to the
correct treatment of price-fixing and market division cases is already at hand in
251
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prices would be harmful unless ancillary to another end.256 More
specifically, it would be illegal per se to set e-book prices “only
when the restraint is ‘naked’—that is, only when the agreement is
not ancillary to cooperative productive activity engaged in by the
agreeing parties.”257 As we will see, the horizontal agreement
between publishers was entirely ancillary to a lawful and
productive vertical arrangement, the agency pricing model.
There is no question that publishers engaged in a horizontal
agreement in order to establish an agency pricing model. The
clearest indication of this is that Macmillan attempted to negotiate
the agency model with Amazon before any collusive steps were
taken by the rest of the publishers.258 This suggests that the
publishers’ only aim was to establish a legal pricing system, rather
than to arbitrarily raise e-book prices and increase revenue.259
Moreover, both the DOJ and Judge Cote acknowledge that the
alleged “collusion” between publishers was a means to establish
agency pricing with retailers.260 Indeed, the government offers no
evidence of further collusion once the agency model was set in
place in January 2010. It is clear, therefore, that here, as in
Broadcast Music, the horizontal arrangement between defendants
was ancillary to a single and proper purpose.261
the concept of ancillary restraints.”).
256
HOLMES & MANGIARACINA, supra note 65, § 2:9.
257
BORK, supra note 46, at 262.
258
See Stone & Rich, supra note 245.
259
Indeed, certain commentators have noted that book publishers likely
made less per book under the agency model. As Adam C. Engst has pointed out,
overall earnings might have dropped by “as much as seventeen percent.” Adam
C. Engst, Explaining the Apple Ebook Price Fixing Suit, TIDBITS (July 10,
2013), http://tidbits.com/article/13912 (“Consider a $29.99 hardcover that Apple
would sell for $14.99. The publisher would earn 70 percent of that, or roughly
$10.50. But under the wholesale model, the publisher might have sold that book
to Amazon for as much as $15.”)
260
See United States v. Apple, Inc., 889 F. Supp. 2d 623, 632 (S.D.N.Y.
2012) (noting that “the Complaint alleges unlawful communications and
industry collusion that gave rise to a series of agreements designed to ensure
defendants’ use of agency pricing for e-books . . . .”).
261
Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19 (1979)
(finding that a blanket license was not a “naked restrain[t] of trade with no

THROWING THE E-BOOK AT PUBLISHERS

385

The agency model adopted by publishers is completely legal.
The Supreme Court has long recognized the validity of vertical
price maintenance, despite the confusion caused by Dr. Miles.262
As discussed above, the Leegin court officially overruled Dr.
Miles, finding that vertical retail-price maintenance often has procompetitive benefits.263 Vertical arrangements have since become
difficult to prove illegal, and are often viewed by the courts as
legal.264 Even the government contends that it “does not object to
the agency method of distribution in the e-book industry . . . .”265
Moreover, actual price maintenance cannot be said to exist when
prices are established through a valid agency relationship,266 which
is the case in United States v. Apple, Inc.
C. Under the Efficiency Prong the Horizontal Agreement
Creates Economic Efficiency in the E-book Market
Under the third prong of the proposed economic-effects test,
the court would consider what, if any, effects a business restraint
has on economic efficiency in a particular market. As discussed
earlier in Part II.B,267 market efficiency is the true measure of
antitrust policy. Just as procompetitive restraints were once
presumed legal, courts should recognize “a presumption in favor of
the legality of those restraints that usually promote efficiency.”268
purpose except stifling of competition . . . but rather accompanies the integration
of sales, monitoring, and enforcement against unauthorized copyright use . . . .”)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
262
See, e.g., United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 488 (1926)
(“We are of opinion, therefore, that there is nothing as a matter of principle or in
the authorities which requires us to hold that genuine contracts of agency like
those before us, however comprehensive as a mass or whole in their effect, are
violations of the Anti-Trust Act.”).
263
See supra Part I.B; see also Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v.
PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 895 (2007).
264
See KESSLER & WALLER, supra note 48.
265
Response of Plaintiff United States to Public Comments, supra note 43,
at 7.
266
See KESSLER & WALLER, supra note 48.
267
See supra Part II.B.
268
Piraino, Making Sense of the Rule of Reason, supra note 76, at 1755. A
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At the very least, defendants must be given an opportunity to
present a plausible efficiency defense by showing that a business
restraint increases efficiency.269 Therefore, the courts’ task when
evaluating such a restraint is to distinguish between arrangements
that diminish efficiency and those that promote it.270 The
horizontal retail-price agreement, as it was implemented by book
publishers in April 2010, promoted efficiency in the e-book
market.271 The publishers, therefore, should have the opportunity
to explain their case in court.272
Publishers acted to correct a problem wrought by Amazon,
which created inefficiency by monopolizing the e-book market.
“The offense of monopoly under Section 2 of the Sherman Act has
two elements: (1) the possession of monopoly power in the
relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of
that power as distinguished from growth or development as a
consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic
accident.”273
First, Amazon possessed monopoly powers in the relevant
market. It is undisputed that before the advent of the agency
model, Amazon enjoyed a ninety-percent share of the e-book
market,274 a fact which the government omits from both its
presumption of reasonableness is nothing new; in fact, it harkens back to Justice
Brandeis’s opinion in Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. United States, 246
U.S. 231, 238 (1918). Justice Brandeis observed that “[e]very agreement
concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of
their very essence. The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is
such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether
it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition.” Id.
269
Leslie, supra note 18, at 267. See also In re Mass. Bd. of Registration in
Optometry, 110 F.T.C. 549, 604 (1988) (“[A] defense is plausible if it cannot be
rejected without extensive factual inquiry.”).
270
Piraino, Making Sense of the Rule of Reason, supra note 76, at 1768.
271
See id. at 1780.
272
See id.
273
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966).
274
See, e.g., Comments of Barnes & Noble, Inc. on the Proposed Final
Judgment at 9, United States v. Apple, Inc., 889 F. Supp. 2d 623 (S.D.N.Y.
2012) (No. 12 Civ. 2826); Hiltzick, supra note 14; Maher, supra note 12;
Phillips, supra note 14.
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briefs.275 The predominant size of Amazon’s market share was a
clear indication of its monopoly power in the e-book market.276
Second, Amazon maintained its market power through illegal
methods—namely, predatory pricing. The Second Circuit has held
that “[t]he relationship between a firm’s prices and its marginal
costs provides the best single determinate of predatory pricing.”277
Thus, contrary to the DOJ’s opinion, abundant evidence shows that
Amazon was indeed guilty of predatory pricing before the advent
of the agency model.278 Beginning with the launch of the Kindle in
275

The government appears completely unwilling to admit that by 2010,
Amazon had monopolized the e-book market. Its contention that returning price
discretion back to retailers will “allow competition to return to the market”
therefore strains credulity. See Competitive Impact Statement, supra note 10, at
12. That there was no competition before the agency model is obvious to anyone
who examines the data. Moreover, any competition in the market today was a
direct result of publishers ensuring that e-book prices remain remunerative,
encouraging other retailers, like Barnes & Noble and Apple, to enter the market.
276
See, e.g., Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 571 (finding that an eighty-seven percent
market share constituted “monopoly power”); Am. Tobacco Co. v. United
States, 328 U.S. 781, 797 (1946) (finding that “over two-thirds” of the entire
cigarette market constituted a “substantial monopoly”); United States v.
Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 429 (1945) (finding that a ninety percent
market share constituted market power).
277
Ne. Tel. Co. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 651 F.2d 76, 88 (2d Cir. 1981).
278
See BORK, supra note 46, at 144.
Predation may be defined, provisionally, as a firm’s
deliberate aggression against one or more rivals through the
employment of business practices that would not be
considered profit maximizing except for the expectation either
that (1) rivals will be driven from the market, leaving the
predator with a market share sufficient to command monopoly
profits, or (2) rivals will be chastened sufficiently to abandon
competitive behavior the predator finds inconvenient or
threatening.”). It is clear that Amazon’s pricing practices meet
both requirements. Moreover, Amazon was in a unique
position to subsidize low returns in the e-book market with
higher returns in its profitable consumer-goods sales, thus
giving it the ability to sell e-books at cut-rate prices for an
indefinite period of time.
Id.; see also Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related
Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697, 721
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2007, Amazon sold e-books to consumers at a considerable loss.279
Under the wholesale model, publishers sold copies of print- and ebooks to Amazon for roughly fifty percent of the list price of the
printed edition.280 Amazon then offered many e-books—especially
new releases and New York Times bestsellers—to consumers for a
“cut-rate” price of $9.99.281 Thus, an e-book with a list price of
$26.00 would be sold to Amazon for $13.00; Amazon in turn sold
the title to consumers for $9.99—a marginal loss of $3.00.282 Other
sources estimate that Amazon lost as much as $4.00 or $5.00 on
every e-book it sold.283 Either way, assuming that Amazon’s
marginal cost was no less than the wholesale cost of an e-book, it
is clear that Amazon was pricing e-books well below marginal
cost.284 Accordingly, pursuant to Second Circuit precedent,
Amazon was clearly engaging in predatory pricing.285 Amazon
also preserved its market power in a number of other questionable
ways, including retaliating against publishers that attempted to take
advantage of other e-books platforms; removing the online “buy”
buttons for titles from publishers that did not agree to Amazon’s
(1975).
279

Maher, supra note 12 (estimating that Amazon lost $35 million on ebook sales through October 2009); see also Brief of Bob Kohn, supra note 11, at
21; BRANDT, supra note 1, at 142. The government’s contention that “Amazon’s
e-book distribution business has been consistently profitable” is inexplicable, as
it is supported by neither economic analysis nor simple common sense. See, e.g.,
Complaint, supra note 3, at 9. Moreover, profitability is not relevant in a
predatory-pricing analysis because it is not a proper indication of efficiency. See
BORK, supra note 46, at 106 (arguing that efficiency “is not a concept
coterminous with profitability. A firm may be profitable because it forms a
cartel, merges to monopolistic size, or employs predatory tactics successfully.
Profitability based upon such tactics is not evidence of productive efficiency
because consumer welfare is lessened rather than increased. Profitability in such
cases is based upon the disruption of allocative efficiency rather than the
enhancement of productive efficiency.”).
280
Competitive Impact Statement, supra note 10, at 3.
281
Id.; see also BRANDT, supra note 1, at 142; Lacy, supra note 10.
282
Brief of Bob Kohn, supra note 11, at 21.
283
BRANDT, supra note 1, at 142; Lacy, supra note 10.
284
Brief of Bob Kohn, supra note 11, at 22.
285
Ne. Tel. Co. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 651 F.2d 76, 88 (1981) (“[P]rices
below reasonably anticipated marginal cost will be presumed illegal.”).
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contractual terms; and pursuing exclusive distribution agreements
with authors.286
According to adherents of the Chicago School, the real
problem with Amazon’s e-book monopoly was that it caused
inefficiency.287 This is because the monopolist creates “a gap
between marginal cost and price, which means that social costs and
social desires are no longer equated.”288 By selling e-books at
unremunerative prices, Amazon prevented rivals from entering the
market and thereby stifled efficiency-creating innovation.289 More
importantly, Amazon’s predatory pricing led to a market failure
that caused overconsumption of e-books.290 Because e-books were
sold at artificially low prices, more of them were purchased than
could be efficiently produced.291 When viewed from a purely
economic perspective, then, the publishers’ anxiety over “the $9.99
problem” was entirely justified. Publishers were not simply
worried about protecting their own profits; rather, as the Second
Circuit has recognized, the type of predatory pricing perpetrated by
Amazon, and its resultant inefficiency, directly threatened

286

United States v. Apple, Inc., 889 F. Supp. 2d 623, 639 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
Leslie, supra note 18, at 250. See also BORK, supra note 46, at 101.
288
BORK, supra note 46, at 101 (“The evil of monopoly, then, is not higher
prices or smaller production (though these are its concomitants) but misallocated
resources, or allocation inefficiency.”).
289
See Areeda & Turner, supra note 278, at 698. Indeed, the DOJ
recognizes that Apple was unable to enter the e-book market before the advent
of the agency model because e-book prices were prohibitively low. This was
not, as the DOJ claims, due to the “intense price competition that prevailed
among e-book retailers in late 2009”—competition that did not exist given that
Amazon held 90 percent of the market. See Complaint, supra note 3, at 3.
Rather, it was due entirely to Amazon’s illegal predatory pricing, which also
deterred other competitors, like Google, Barnes & Noble, and Zola Books from
entering the market. Apple, Inc., 889 F. Supp. 2d at 639.
290
See Leslie, supra note 18, at 268.
291
The DOJ betrays a lack of economic understanding when it asserts that
publishers’ agency model “prevented e-book retailers from experimenting with
innovative pricing strategies that could efficiently respond to consumer
demand.” Competitive Impact Statement, supra note 10, at 9. In fact, it was the
publishers’ agreement that corrected the supply-demand curve by returning
consumption to an efficient level.
287
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consumer welfare.292
The book publishers in United States v. Apple, Inc. acted
efficiently (and legally) by correcting the market failure caused by
Amazon’s predatory pricing of e-books.293 In order to understand
why the publishers’ price-fixing arrangement was efficient, we
must briefly consider the economic theory of the second best.
According to Professors Lipsey and Lancaster in their seminal
work on the matter, the general theory of the second best states that
if optimal conditions of efficiency cannot be fulfilled, “a second
best optimum situation is achieved only by departing from all other
optimum conditions.”294 When there is a monopoly constraint on
output, for instance, further constraints may be required to achieve
a desirable situation.295 The theory of the second best thus suggests
that if two market failures occur in a market and the government
cannot resolve both of them, “it may be more efficient to leave the
market unregulated despite the failures.”296 In other words, the
theory of the second best turns on its head the old apothegm that
two wrongs don’t make a right.297 By suggesting that, in the
context of the e-book market, two wrongs can make a right, this
theory effectively rebuts the DOJ’s contention that horizontal
price-fixing is per se illegal even if it leads to an optimum
situation.298 The theory of the second best also casts doubt on
Judge Cote’s observation that “[t]he familiar mantra regarding
‘two wrongs’ would seem to offer guidance in these
circumstances.”299
The theory of the second best holds that “[i]f two market
292

See Ne. Tel. Co. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 651 F.2d 76, 87 (2d Cir. 1981).
See United States v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 163 F.3d 737, 741–42 (2d
Cir. 1998) (“The purpose of the [Sherman] Act is not to protect businesses from
the working of the market; it is to protect the public from the failure of the
market.”) (quoting Spectrum Sports v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458 (1993)).
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failures exist simultaneously[,] one causing underconsumption and
one causing overconsumption,” the failures will “balance each
other and create a more efficient equilibrium than if antitrust
enforcement eliminated only one market failure.”300 In this case,
book publishers created a market failure—by promoting underconsumption of e-books—to counteract the original market failure
caused by Amazon. Because the DOJ declined to uphold optimum
conditions by addressing the original Amazon market failure,
publishers were left to re-establish efficiency by their own means,
which included both vertical and horizontal pricing
arrangements301 that eliminated monopolistic predatory pricing and
allowed competition in the market. This conduct was completely
legal under the Sherman Act, which is meant to eliminate
inefficiencies in the market thereby promoting consumer
welfare.302 Indeed, the publishers’ actions corrected the Amazon
market failure, maximized efficiency, and therefore promoted the
true goal of the Sherman Act: the promotion of consumer
welfare.303

300

Leslie, supra note 18, at 268–69. Leslie argues that “[a]ccording to the
theory of the second best, when other market failures are also present the various
failures may cancel each other out, so that nonenforcement of antitrust laws
maximizes efficiency.” Id. at 244.
301
To her credit, Judge Cote briefly acknowledged the possibility that
Apple and the publishers were merely responding to the predatory pricing
initiated by Amazon. However, by denying the Defendants an opportunity to
explain the situation, Judge Cote cleaved too closely to the per se rule. See
United States v. Apple, Inc., No. 12 Civ. 2826, 2013 WL 3454986 at *58
(S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2013) (“If Apple is suggesting that Amazon was engaging in
illegal, monopolistic practices, and that Apple’s combination with the Publisher
Defendants to deprive a monopolist of some of its market power is procompetitive and healthy for our economy, it is wrong. This trial has not been the
occasion to decide whether Amazon’s choice to sell NYT Bestsellers or other
New Releases as loss leaders was an unfair trade practice or in any other way a
violation of law. If it was, however, the remedy for illegal conduct is a
complaint lodged with the proper law enforcement offices or a civil suit or
both.”).
302
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303
Id. at 283.
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CONCLUSION
By disregarding the true purpose of the Sherman Act, the
District Court in United States v. Apple, Inc. did a profound
disservice not only to the book-publishing industry, but to antitrust
law at large. The court accomplished the very opposite of good
policy: it chastened Apple and the publishers for seeking to restore
efficiency to the e-book market, while permitting Amazon to reexert its monopolistic dominance through a return to predatory
pricing. Yet there is still hope that the initial decision in United
States v. Apple, Inc. represents a preamble to a happier, more
satisfying story. The Second Circuit—and perhaps even the U.S.
Supreme Court—will have an opportunity to rewrite the fate of the
burgeoning e-book industry.
In re-examining the business arrangements at the heart of
United States v. Apple, Inc., the higher courts ought not only to
extend the rule of reason to the horizontal arrangements in this
case (as the lower court failed to do), but apply an improved threeprong economic-effects test based on a contemporary
understanding of economics. The courts should thus consider
whether (1) the publishing industry and e-book markets are unique
or unfamiliar; (2) the publishers’ price restraint was ancillary to the
creation of a proper agency model; and (3) the arrangement
improved efficiency and promoted consumer welfare. By applying
this nuanced analysis, the higher courts will best advance the
interests of the public and ensure that justice is served. Thus, while
the first chapter of this story is complete, the book is far from
finished.

